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Race, Restructurings, and Equal
Protection Doctrine Through the Lens
of Schuette v. BAMN
Steve Sanders†
INTRODUCTION
The imperative of fair lawmaking processes is a
fundamental principle of constitutional law.1 It may well be that
“in wide areas of life[,] majorities are entitled to rule, if they wish,
simply because they are majorities,”2 and that the political
marketplace “will sometimes operate in favor of one faction;
sometimes in favor of another.”3 But if a majority prevails on a
matter of public policy, it should not be because that majority
rigged the lawmaking process in its favor so that the process itself
was no longer neutral. The “ins” should not be able to alter the
political process “to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will
stay out.”4
In 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
ruled that the voters of Michigan had violated these principles
when they amended their state constitution to prohibit raceconscious affirmative action in public university admissions.5 The
Sixth Circuit reasoned that the amendment, known as the
“Michigan Civil Rights Initiative” or “Proposal 2,” had “reordered
† Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law,
Bloomington, Indiana. For helpful conversations and suggestions on this project, I am
grateful to Eric Berger, Kevin Brown, Evan Caminker, Daniel Conkle, Sam Erman,
Dawn Johnsen, Rebecca Zietlow, and fellow participants in the Loyola University
Chicago Constitutional Law Colloquium.
1 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87 (1980) (observing
that under the Constitution, “the selection and accommodation of substantive values is
left almost entirely to the political process,” while the provisions of the document itself
are “overwhelmingly concerned . . . with what might capaciously be designated process
writ large[ ] —with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions of
government” (footnotes omitted)).
2 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 139 (1990).
3 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 394 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
4 ELY, supra note 1, at 103.
5 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and
Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701
F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
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the political process”6 by removing authority on affirmative
action from elected university governing boards and placing it
(i.e., forbidding it) in the state constitution. In itself, such a
reordering of the lawmaking process—or a “political restructuring,”
as it is more commonly known—does not violate the Constitution
because it is commonly understood that states have “wide leeway
when experimenting with the appropriate allocation of state
legislative power.”7 But the Sixth Circuit concluded that Proposal
2 violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
because the restructuring worked to the political disadvantage of
African-Americans, who overwhelmingly favor affirmative action
as a government policy.8
“A student seeking to have her family’s alumni
connections considered in her application to one of Michigan’s
esteemed public universities,” the court said, had a variety of
avenues available to her, such as petitioning the admissions
committee or lobbying the school’s governing board.9 A black
student who wanted to see a university adopt a constitutionally
valid affirmative action program, on the other hand, “could do
only one thing to effect change: she could attempt to amend the
Michigan Constitution—a lengthy, expensive, and arduous
process—to repeal the consequences of Proposal 2.”10 “[S]uch a
comparative structural burden,” the court said, “undermines
the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee that all citizens ought
to have equal access to the tools of political change.”11
The Sixth Circuit relied on the so-called Hunter/Seattle, or
“political-process doctrine,” named for two of the Supreme Court’s
racial equal protection decisions, Hunter v. Erickson12 and
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.13 The Sixth Circuit
said that the Hunter/Seattle doctrine stood for the principle that
“an enactment deprives minority groups of the equal protection of
the laws when it . . . target[s] a policy or program that ‘inures
primarily to the benefit of the minority’; and . . . reallocates
political power or reorders the decisionmaking process in a way
Id. at 483.
Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978).
8 See, e.g., Bruce Drake, Public Strongly Backs Affirmative Action Programs
on Campus, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/
04/22/public-strongly-backs-affirmative-action-programs-on-campus/ [http://perma.cc/2HV8R8CE] (reporting that 84% of blacks believe that “affirmative action programs designed to
increase the number of black and minority students on college campuses are a ‘good
thing,’” while 8% think they are a “bad thing”).
9 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 470.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
13 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
6
7
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that places special burdens on [that] minority group’s ability to
achieve its goals through that process.”14 Significantly, however,
the Sixth Circuit was careful to avoid saying that Proposal 2
created a racial classification or was motivated by a purpose of
discriminating on the basis of race. In other words, the Sixth
Circuit did not say that the “comparative structural burden” of
Proposal 2 arose from intentional, race-conscious action by
Michigan voters. Consistent with the view that the Hunter/Seattle
doctrine allowed for the finding of a constitutional violation based
only on the detrimental political-process effects of a restructuring
on a minority group, the court eschewed any need to apply what it
called “traditional” equal protection analysis, which requires an
intentional decision to create a racial classification or to otherwise
discriminate invidiously.15
In a deeply fractured 2014 decision with no majority
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit in
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.16 As five
Justices saw it, Proposal 2 simply reflected disagreement on
the public policy question of affirmative action that the citizens
of Michigan were entitled to settle as they saw fit.17 None of the
Justices, not even the dissenters, thought Proposal 2 had been
impelled by an intent by Michigan voters to disadvantage racial
minorities. According to Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion,
courts must avoid “announc[ing] what particular issues of public
policy should be classified as advantageous to some group
defined by race.”18 To accept the Sixth Circuit’s understanding—
that in outlawing affirmative action, Proposal 2 violated equal
protection because its effect was to place a “special burden” on
African-Americans—would be, according to the plurality, to
accept the “proposition that all individuals of the same race
think alike” on issues of public policy.19

14 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 477 (quoting Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 462, 467).
15 Id. at 489 (“Having found that Proposal 2 deprives the Plaintiffs of equal
protection of the law under the political-process doctrine, we need not reach the
question of whether it also violates the Equal Protection Clause when assessed using
the ‘traditional’ analysis.”).
16 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
17 See id. at 1628 (plurality opinion by Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.,
and Alito, J.); id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
18 Id. at 1635 (plurality opinion).
19 Id. at 1634 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1643-44 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s approach would “promote[ ] the
noxious fiction that, knowing only a person’s color or ethnicity, we can be sure that he
has a predetermined set of policy ‘interests,’ thus ‘reinforc[ing] the perception that
members of the same racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic status,
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The Supreme Court’s opinions in Schuette settled the
constitutionality of Proposal 2, but they created confusion and
uncertainty going forward about how we should think about
political restructurings as a matter of constitutional equal
protection. Three Justices in Schuette thought that the language
in Seattle that the Sixth Circuit relied upon should be
reinterpreted and narrowed, but this plurality did not address
the matter of a larger restructuring doctrine other than to say
that it remains an “unremarkable principle that the state may
not alter the procedures of government to target racial
minorities.”20 Two Justices would have overruled Hunter and
Seattle as incompatible with their understanding of established
equal protection doctrine.21 Two other Justices strongly
defended the Hunter/Seattle doctrine but thought the plurality
had effectively gutted it.22 One Justice thought Proposal 2 was
not a restructuring at all.23
This article provides an in-depth exposition of the
restructuring cases that came before Schuette, an analysis of
the Schuette decision’s place within equal protection doctrine,
and some observations about judicial review of political
restructurings in the future. It advances three arguments.
First, contrary to the understanding of the Sixth Circuit,24
numerous commentators,25 and Justices on both the right and left
poles of the Supreme Court,26 this article argues that the bestknown political restructuring cases, Hunter and Seattle, did not
create an exception to the principle that a violation of the
or the community in which they live—think alike, [and] share the same political
interests’” (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (alteration in original))).
20 Id. at 1632 (plurality opinion).
21 See infra notes 256-63 and accompanying text (discussing opinion
concurring in the judgment by Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.).
22 See infra notes 264-68268 and accompanying text (discussing dissent by
Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.).
23 See infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text (discussing opinion
concurring in the judgment by Breyer, J.).
24 See infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Kerrel Murray, Note, Good Will Hunting: How the Supreme
Court’s Hunter Doctrine Can Still Shield Minorities from Political-Process Discrimination,
66 STAN. L. REV. 443, 462 (2014) (arguing “that the Hunter doctrine does not overlap with
conventional equal protection doctrine”); Daniel P. Tokaji & Mark D. Rosenbaum,
Promoting Equality by Protecting Local Power: A Neo-Federalist Challenge to State
Affirmative Action Bans, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 136 (1999) (arguing that
Hunter and Seattle are not “anomalies, of dubious relevance in light of the Supreme
Court’s general insistence that only facially or intentionally discriminatory laws violate
the Equal Protection Clause” because these cases stand for a principle of “equal access
to the political process”); Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal
Political Burdens, and the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1021, 1035 (1996)
(arguing that discriminatory intent is not required under a Hunter/Seattle analysis).
26 See infra notes 256-68 and accompanying text.
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Equal Protection Clause requires intentional discrimination.27
The contrary view arises in large part, this article suggests,
because the Court in an earlier era was willing to find that
certain government actions constituted intentional race
discrimination without openly accusing lawmakers or voters of
race-conscious action or invidious purposes. Hunter and Seattle
both involved alterations of the political process that worked to
the disadvantage of racial minorities. But contrary to the
conventional wisdom about the Hunter/Seattle doctrine, the
effects of these process alterations, standing alone, are not
what violated equal protection. Rather, the restructurings were
invalidated because the Court perceived that they were
designed to create what the Court characterized as “racial
classifications.” “Classifications” do not arise by accident or as
a matter of mere incidental effect. Although the Court has
never defined exactly what constitutes a “racial classification,”
we can at least infer from its jurisprudence that the term
includes not only facial classifications of persons, but also
policies that reflect intentional, race-conscious decisionmaking.
The Court perceived that the harmful effects of the
restructurings on racial minorities were not a matter of mere
disparate impact, but rather were the restructurings’ actual
purposes. Thus, Hunter and Seattle, properly understood, have
been and remain compatible with “traditional” equal protection
doctrine. This article’s conclusions on this point support the
Schuette plurality opinion; it argues that Justices Scalia and
Thomas (concurring in the judgment) and Justices Sotomayor
and Ginsburg (dissenting) rested their opinions on incorrect
readings of Hunter and Seattle.
Second, Schuette is, above all, a decision reflecting the
current state of the Court’s racial equal protection jurisprudence,
not a decision about political restructurings as such. The Court’s
judgment that Proposal 2 did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause was a logical extension of the current Court’s
“colorblind” understanding of racial equal protection. In Hunter
and Seattle, as well as in an earlier restructuring case,
Reitman v. Mulkey,28 the Court found intentional harm to
minorities in large part because the restructurings in those
cases intentionally targeted policies that the Court recognized
as both beneficial to and supported by racial minorities. But
today the Court is committed to the principle that, for
constitutional purposes, there can be no such thing as a
27
28

See infra notes 269-317 and accompanying text.
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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“minority view” on a question of public policy, including
affirmative action, the subject of Proposal 2. To label Proposal
2 a “racial classification” would be to assume that policy
preferences on racial affirmative action can serve as a proxy for
race itself, a suggestion that to the majority of Justices in
Schuette would have been anathema. Since there was no evidence
of overt racism or other invidious purpose in the campaign to
enact Proposal 2, the Court could characterize Proposal 2 as
nothing more than the product of a vigorous public policy
debate with no equal protection implications.
Finally, Schuette does not alter an important lesson
from the restructuring precedents, which properly include the
gay rights case Romer v. Evans,29 as well as the race cases of
Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle. That lesson is that courts can and
should give more careful scrutiny to political restructurings that
affect minority or disadvantaged groups than is provided by the
baseline, highly deferential form of rational basis review that is
applied to ordinary legislative enactments. The purpose of such
scrutiny should be for a court to satisfy itself that the
restructuring is not a pretext for animus or other invidious
purpose against the affected group. Restructurings are, by
definition, not ordinary legislative enactments; they reflect a
political majority’s intention to go outside the ordinary legislative
process. Experience teaches that when a question of public
policy is taken outside the usual lawmaking process and is
committed to a higher, more remote level of decisionmaking, it
is not unreasonable to suspect that the restructuring might be
intended to work constitutionally improper discrimination
against some group. Restructurings require that courts be alert
for “the ingenuity of those who would seek to conceal [improper
discrimination] by subtleties and claims of neutrality.”30 As the
Court explained in Romer, for example, the use of a state
constitutional amendment to selectively disadvantage a specific
group by overriding the ordinary state and local lawmaking
processes is a “[d]iscrimination[ ] of an unusual character” and
therefore requires “especially . . . careful consideration to
determine whether” it is “obnoxious” to the [C]onstitution[ ] .”31
This article proceeds in five parts. Part I explains how
the political restructuring doctrine arises from a larger body of
legal thought known as “political-process theory,” which is
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 834 (Cal. 1966), aff’d sub nom. Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
31 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (alteration in original) (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)).
29

30
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associated with Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene
Products Co.32 and the work of constitutional theorist John Hart
Ely. Part II provides a close, detailed examination of the
restructuring cases before Schuette. Part III discusses Schuette’s
background, the Sixth Circuit decision, and the Supreme Court
Justices’ opinions. Part IV provides this article’s two primary
doctrinal arguments. It explains why the idea of a Hunter/Seattle
doctrine never rested on solid ground and how the Court’s
“colorblind” racial equal protection jurisprudence largely explains
the outcome in Schuette. Finally, Part V explains why careful
judicial scrutiny of restructurings for invidious purposes remains
both permissible and necessary, especially given the inherent
flaws of direct democracy.
I.

RESTRUCTURINGS AS A POLITICAL PROCESS ISSUE

The doctrine of political restructurings has its roots in a
larger body of legal thought that is typically called “politicalprocess theory.”33 Political process theory is closely associated
with the work of John Hart Ely, particularly his 1980 book
Democracy and Distrust,34 and with Footnote Four of Carolene
Products. The core principle of political-process theory is that
“judicial scrutiny should increase when a socially subordinated
group cannot compete fairly in the political process,” and thus
“a court’s ability to override” a law “ought to be calibrated
based on the fairness of the political process that produced” it.35
While most business and social legislation receives
deferential rational basis review, Footnote Four suggested that
“more exacting judicial scrutiny” may be appropriate where an
enactment “restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation” or manifests “prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities . . . [that] tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities.”36 Building on these themes, Ely argued that these
passages of Footnote Four “are concerned with participation:
they ask us to focus not on whether this or that substantive
value is unusually important or fundamental”—the usual stuff
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory
Through the Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (2011) (discussing
the “specialized doctrine” within political-process theory “that closely scrutinizes acts of
‘political restructuring’ that adversely affect minority groups”).
34 See generally ELY, supra note 1.
35 Schacter, supra note 33, at 1364.
36 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
32

33

1400

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:4

of constitutional analysis on questions of individual rights and
equality—“but rather on whether the opportunity to participate
either in the political processes by which values are appropriately
identified and accommodated, or in the accommodation those
processes have reached, has been unduly constricted.”37
Ely understood “participation” broadly to encompass
more than simply voting (though equal access to the franchise
is a core political-process value). We know that the lawmaking
process is malfunctioning and “undeserving of trust,” Ely
wrote, when “the ins are choking off the channels of political
change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay
out,” or when “representatives beholden to an effective majority
are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple
hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of
interest.”38 Such majoritarian abuses deny the minority “the
protection afforded other groups by a representative system.”39
According to Ely, Footnote Four teaches that courts
must “keep the machinery of democratic government running
as it should” and “make sure the channels of political
participation and communication are kept open.”40 A focus on
process allows for meaningful judicial review “without dragging
courts into endlessly contested debates about substantive
values and ideas.”41 It is a way to maintain the principle that
“substantive decisions are generally to be made democratically
in our society and constitutional decisions are generally to be
limited to policing the mechanisms of decision and distribution.”42
The health and fairness of these process mechanisms is critical, Ely
thought, because “[t]he constitutionality of most distributions . . .
cannot be determined simply by looking to see who ended up with
what, but rather can be approached intelligibly only by attending
to the process that brought about the distribution in question.”43
Political restructurings are a natural concern for process
theory because restructurings involve changing the process by
which certain laws are made—usually by moving the locus of
decisionmaking to a higher and more remote level of
ELY, supra note 1, at 77.
Id. at 103.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 76.
41 Schachter, supra note 33, at 1364.
42 ELY, supra note 1, at 181.
43 Id. at 136; accord Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and
the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 128 (1982) (arguing that the
purpose of equal protection “is to prohibit unprincipled distributions of resources and
opportunities. Distributions are unprincipled when they are not an effort to serve a
public value, but reflect the view that it is intrinsically desirable to treat one person
better than another”).
37

38
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government—to help achieve a particular substantive outcome.
Typically this means taking matters that are within the
customary police powers of state legislatures or local
governments away from those bodies and committing them to a
state constitution or city charter. For example, want to get rid
of legislatively approved fair housing laws and ensure that they
won’t be reenacted? Get the voters to amend your state
constitution to give property owners the right to refuse to sell
or lease their property to anyone for any reason.44 Want to
prevent gays and lesbians from using the ordinary legislative
lawmaking process to advance their legal equality? Go over the
heads of those elected legislators and ask the voters to ban
“special rights” for homosexuals,45 or insist that an ordinary
question of statutory family law—the qualifications for
marriage—be decided in a statewide constitutional referendum.46
Restructurings are problematic because they intentionally bypass
an ordinary lawmaking process that affords at least some
protection for pluralism and minority interests (because it “offers
time for reflection, exposure to competing needs, and occasions
for transforming preferences”47) in favor of a different process—
usually direct democracy—where the majority’s numerical and
resource advantages, and the minority’s politically inferior
position, both are magnified.
The rationales articulated by the Justices in the
restructuring cases reflect many of these same principles. For
example, concurring in Hunter, Justice Harlan observed that
“laws which define the structure of political institutions” must
be “designed with the aim of providing a just framework within
which the diverse political groups in our society may fairly
compete” and should not be “enacted with the purpose of
assisting one particular group in its struggle with its political
opponents.”48 In itself, he said, a polity’s decision to adopt a
voter-referendum system, or a supermajority requirement for
amending a state constitution, is grounded in a “neutral
principle,”49 even if it sometimes operates to the disadvantage
of a minority group. But such procedures raise constitutional
See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text (discussing Reitman).
See infra notes 183-200 and accompanying text (discussing Romer).
46 See Steve Sanders, Mini-DOMAs as Political Process Failures: The Case for
Heightened Scrutiny of State Anti-Gay Marriage Amendments, 109 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 12, 13-14 (2014) (arguing that state constitutional amendments banning samesex marriage are restructurings that should receive heightened scrutiny).
47 Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503,
1527 (1990).
48 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
49 Id. at 395.
44
45
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problems when they are invoked selectively for the “clear
purpose” of imposing a special burden on a minority group.50
Similarly, in Seattle, the Court said that in addition to
guaranteeing the right to vote and to participate equally in “the
political life of the community,” the Equal Protection Clause is
implicated when “‘a political structure’ . . . subtly distorts
governmental processes in such a way as to place special
burdens on . . . minority groups.”51 A “political majority may
generally restructure the political process to place obstacles in the
path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of governmental
action. But a different analysis is required when the State
allocates governmental power non-neutrally,” such as when
racial considerations are used “to determine the decisionmaking
process” that is prescribed by a law.52 Quoting Footnote Four, the
Seattle Court said that “when the State’s allocation of power
places unusual burdens on the ability of racial groups to enact
legislation specifically designed to overcome the ‘special condition’
of prejudice, the governmental action seriously ‘curtail[s] the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities.’”53
This article concludes by arguing that these basic
principles of judicial engagement to prevent majoritarian abuses
of the political process survive the judgment in Schuette and
remain relevant to political restructurings. To fully appreciate
that argument, though, it is first necessary to understand how
the Court approached political restructurings before Schuette
and how we should think about Schuette as an equal
protection decision.
II.

RESTRUCTURING DOCTRINE BEFORE SCHUETTE

A.

“Traditional” Equal Protection

In Schuette, the central disagreement between the Sixth
Circuit and a majority of the Supreme Court Justices, as well
as among the Justices themselves, was whether the Court’s preSchuette restructuring cases gave rise to a “Hunter/Seattle
doctrine” that is different from “traditional” equal protection

Id.
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982) (quoting
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 84 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
52 Id. at 470.
53 Id. at 486 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153
n.4 (1938)).
50
51
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doctrine. An appropriate first step in this analysis is to set forth
what “traditional” equal protection doctrine actually means.
An equal protection violation requires intentional or
purposeful discrimination.54 A disproportionate adverse effect
or impact on a group, standing alone, will not establish an
equal protection violation,55 though the fact that a “law bears
more heavily on one [group] than another” can be one factor in
the analysis for intentional discrimination.56 Before the mid1970s, the Court did not distinguish as sharply as it does today
between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect.57
That change in the doctrine, as well as the Court’s treatment of
affirmative action as part of a shift toward a so-called
colorblind conception of racial equal protection, is helpful to
understanding Schuette.58
For suspect and quasi-suspect classes, the intentional
creation of a classification—regardless of whether the
classification’s purpose is harmful or benign—triggers the
appropriate level of judicial review (strict scrutiny for suspect
classes, “intermediate” for quasi-suspect classes). For all other
classifications or forms of discrimination involving nonsuspect
groups, judicial review is supposed to determine whether the
challenged law or policy bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate government interest. Among the ways the rational
basis test can be failed is where the discrimination is entirely
arbitrary59 or where it is impelled by animus or a purpose to
inflict harm.60
In the simplest example concerning a suspect or quasisuspect classification, a law may facially draw a classification—
for example, “all white children go to School A, all black
children go to School B”—and such a classification would
automatically get heightened scrutiny. But a policy need not
affect every member of a group in order to be labeled a
“classification.” For instance, in the context of public higher
education, even when race is used as a “‘plus’ factor” to benefit
a relatively small number of minority students in a selective
54 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (observing that “our cases
have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because
it has a racially disproportionate impact”).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 242.
57 See infra notes 326-29 and accompanying text.
58 See infra Part IV.
59 E.g. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm’n of Webster Cty., 488
U.S. 336, 344-46 (1989).
60 E.g. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
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admissions process, the Court nonetheless considers it to be a
“classification.”61 That is because the process still employs race
as a decisionmaking factor. The Court also has said that a racial
classification may be found where a law is facially neutral or
contains no “explicit racial distinctions,” but circumstances
compel the conclusion that the law is a pretext for invidious
discrimination or is “unexplainable on grounds other than
race.”62 The Court has never actually defined the term
“classification” in any specific way,63 and as this article will
explain, the Court’s less-than-precise approach to the matter of
classifications helps to explain disagreement about the existence,
or not, of a Hunter/Seattle doctrine.64
Even without any sort of formal classification, evidence
may demonstrate that “a motivating factor”65 behind a law or
practice was animus or some other form of invidious intent.66
The Court has said that determining whether a law was
motivated by an invidious purpose “demands a sensitive inquiry”
to examine both “circumstantial and direct evidence.”67 This
inquiry takes place at the outset: before applying the appropriate
level of judicial scrutiny, the court first must determine whether
the law classifies or discriminates at all.68 The Court has
suggested a number of factors to guide this inquiry. For example,
“[t]he impact of the official action”—whether it ‘“bears more
heavily’” on one group than another—“may provide an important
starting point.”69 Other considerations may include “[t]he
historical background of the decision . . . particularly if it
reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes,”
legislative and administrative history, “[t]he specific sequence
of events leading up to the challenged decision,” departures
from normal procedures, and “[s]ubstantive departures . . . ,
particularly if the factors usually considered important by the
decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 335 (2003).
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (quoting Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
63 Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (2013)
(observing that racial classification is “a term the Court has never once defined”).
64 See infra notes 289-97 and accompanying text.
65 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
66 E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (finding that a pattern
of discriminatory administration of an ostensibly neutral regulation could be explained
only by “hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong”).
67 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
68 Id.; accord ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (3d ed. 2009)
(“Equal protection analysis always must begin by identifying how the government is
distinguishing among people.”).
69 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 242 (1976)).
61

62
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reached.”70 The Court has also said that improper “discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts” where the discrimination is “very difficult to explain on
nonracial grounds.”71
B.

The Supreme Court’s Restructuring Cases

The Hunter/Seattle doctrine is said to stand for the
principle that an equal protection violation can be found where a
political restructuring results in an adverse impact or effect on a
racial minority’s ability to achieve its goals in the political process,
but without a finding that the restructuring was driven by either
race-conscious decisionmaking or invidious purpose. In Schuette,
a majority of Justices rejected this understanding of the
Hunter/Seattle doctrine, but the fractured set of opinions provided
virtually no guidance for thinking about future restructurings.
To evaluate whether Schuette was correct in rejecting a
Hunter/Seattle doctrine, and to understand how political
restructurings should be judicially analyzed in the future, a
careful examination of the restructuring precedents is necessary.
The following section lays that foundation, giving a closer, more
detailed reading of these cases than previous scholarship has
provided. This close reading demonstrates that political-process
concerns, as such, were not dispositive for the outcomes in these
cases. Rather, these process concerns informed the Court’s
ultimate conclusions that the restructurings violated substantive
constitutional guarantees of equal treatment. Later, this article
discusses how this understanding of the restructuring precedents
helps explain the outcome in Schuette, and it engages with the
perspectives that other commentators have offered on these cases.72
1. Reitman v. Mulkey
In the 1960s, California enacted several statutes
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race in the sale or
rental of property. These laws provoked “considerable opposition”
in the state,73 and voters in the 1964 election adopted an
amendment to the California constitution that provided, in
pertinent part, that
[n]either the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny,
limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is
70
71
72
73

Id. at 267.
Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
See infra Section IV.A.
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 387 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real
property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person
or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.74

The amendment (referred to by the Court as “Section 26” for the
place it would have occupied within Article I of the California state
constitution) did not mention race or antidiscrimination laws, and
on its face, the “right” conferred by the amendment had no
apparent connection to these things.
a. The California Amendment as a Restructuring
The Supreme Court was careful to observe that the
mere repeal of a law protecting a minority group would not, in
itself, violate the Constitution.75 But Section 26 was more than
merely a repeal; it “struck more deeply and more widely.”76 A
mere repeal of fair housing laws, even if executed by citizen
initiative, would have allowed the question to be brought up
again in the future through the ordinary legislative process,
where the laws might have been reenacted at some future date
as the result of new evidence, changing social attitudes, elections,
or the success of minority groups in building coalitions to
persuade legislators to support new laws. But the purpose of
elevating a legislative policy issue to the level of the state
constitution is to check the operation of such normal political
processes and prevent an ordinary legislative majority’s decision
from being revisited down the road.
Section 26 was thus a restructuring. It took a specific
issue (nondiscrimination in housing), which was ordinarily
decided by the legislature as a matter of statutory law, and moved
it to a higher, more remote level of government by placing it in
the state constitution. After the passage of Section 26, reinstating
fair housing laws would require re-amending the state
constitution, a far more arduous and expensive process (and at
the time, a prohibitively difficult one for racial minorities) than
working through the ordinary legislative process.
Uncovering the workings of Section 26 and explaining
why, as a restructuring, it differed from an ordinary statutory
enactment was key to the Court’s analysis. Amending a state
constitution is different, both in its legal effect and its
expressive power, from passing or repealing an ordinary
statute. A constitutional provision controls and limits more
74
75
76

Id. at 371 (quoting Proposition 14).
Id. at 376.
Id. at 377.
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government behavior and says more about government’s values
and priorities than does an ordinary statute. Section 26 did
more than simply reverse the judgment of elected lawmakers
on a statutory matter concerning race discrimination. It also
prevented similar statutory enactments in the future. And it
elevated the matter to the state’s highest, most remote level of
government decisionmaking: its constitution. Thus, as the
California Supreme Court reasoned in one of the opinions
below that the U.S. Supreme Court expressly endorsed, even if
the state had not set out with a purpose to discriminate, it had
“lent its processes”—that is, the initiative process by which the
California constitution could be amended—to private individuals
who aimed to remove barriers holding back those who did have
such a discriminatory purpose.77 Citizens who wanted to turn
back the clock to the days before state government interfered with
private racial discrimination were given access to the place where
the state government announces its most profound values.
Elaborating on this theme, the U.S. Supreme Court
observed,
Private discriminations in housing were now not only free from [the
repealed nondiscrimination statutes] but they also enjoyed a far
different status than was true before the passage of those statutes.
The right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on
racial grounds, was now embodied in the State’s basic charter,
immune from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level
of the state government. Those practicing racial discriminations
need no longer rely solely on their personal choice. They could now
invoke express constitutional authority, free from censure or
interference of any kind from official sources.78

In the same vein, Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion called
Section 26 “a form of sophisticated discrimination whereby the
people of California [attempted to] harness the energies of
private groups to do indirectly what they cannot under our
decisions allow their government to do.”79 In other words, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Reitman was concerned not only by the
substance of the change voters had made in their state’s law,
but also by the process they had used to engineer that change.
The analyses of process and substance went hand in hand.

77 Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 831 (Cal. 1966), aff’d sub nom. Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
78 Reitman, 387 U.S. at 377 (emphases added).
79 Id. at 383 (Douglas, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
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b. The California Amendment as Race Discrimination
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
improperly discriminating, but it does not require states to
legislate against discrimination by private citizens. And it is
possible, of course, to oppose antidiscrimination laws based on
political or philosophical principles without favoring race
discrimination. The property owners defending Section 26 argued
that the measure was innocent because it was merely a repeal;
it simply made the state “neutral” on matters of race
discrimination in private-property transactions.80
The Court refused to accept this characterization and
instead held that Section 26 violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the Court’s view, Section 26 was state action because it created
“a [state] constitutional right to discriminate on racial grounds in
the sale and leasing of real property.”81 Rather than making the
state neutral on the matter of private race discrimination, Section
26 “expressly authorized and constitutionalized the private right
to discriminate”82 and therefore would “encourage and
significantly involve the State in private racial discrimination.”83
As support for this understanding, the Court looked to
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.84 In that case, a
lessee who operated a restaurant in a building owned by a
Delaware state agency refused service to black customers.85
The Court found that the lease arrangement created state
action and implicated the state government in private race
discrimination. By leasing space to the restaurant, the state
had “place[d] its power, property and prestige behind the
admitted discrimination.”86 The Reitman Court also analogized
Section 26 to an Oklahoma state law it had examined in
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Co.,87
which, in the Court’s interpretation, affirmatively “authorized
carriers to provide cars for white persons but not for Negroes.”88
Such a “permissive state statute” was, in effect, “an
authorization” for the private railroad company to discriminate

80
81
82
83
84

(1961)).
85
86
87
88

Id. at 374-75.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 375 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
See Burton, 365 U.S. at 716.
Id. at 725.
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
Reitman, 387 U.S. at 379.
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and thus was “sufficient state action to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.”89
The parallels between Section 26 and these cases are
not perfect. But they make more sense if we understand the
Court in Reitman as endeavoring to look behind Section 26 to
better understand what was really happening in this ballot
initiative. Rather than accepting the restructuring defenders’
characterization at face value, the Court said it was necessary
to analyze Section 26 “in terms of its ‘immediate objective,’ its
‘ultimate effect[,]’ and its ‘historical context and the conditions
existing prior to its enactment.’”90 As support for this
undertaking, the Court cited cases where it had provided close
examination and ultimately found equal protection violations in
situations where invidious discrimination was not immediately
obvious, including Yick Wo v. Hopkins91 and Anderson v. Martin.92
In these cases, careful judicial examination at the outset helped to
identify forms of intentional discrimination that were built into
the design or enforcement of the laws but were not necessarily
apparent on their face.
This analysis revealed that Section 26 had not been
written on a blank slate. It did not, for example, emerge from a
constitutional convention committee charged with developing
protections for property rights. To claim that Section 26 only
kept the state neutral on matters of private race discrimination
was to ignore social facts and the political dynamics surrounding
its enactment. In California and elsewhere, there were whites
who held prejudiced views toward blacks and preferred to keep
blacks out of their neighborhoods or apartment buildings. In the
1960s, California legislators took note of this phenomenon and
outlawed such discrimination. Then, with Section 26, the state’s
citizens came together not only to repudiate those laws but also to
permanently prevent their reenactment. From this sequence of
events—this “historical context”—the Court concluded that the
real “objective” of the voters who had acted in the name of the
state to approve Section 26, and the “ultimate effect” of the
amendment, was not to protect property rights but rather to
clear the way for private discrimination to resume under the
Id.
Id. at 373 (quoting Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d, 825, 829 (Cal. 1966)).
91 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (finding that a pattern of
discriminatory administration of an ostensibly neutral regulation could be explained
only by “hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong”).
92 Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (striking down Louisiana law that
required a candidate’s race to be listed on an election ballot, because such a requirement
encouraged race discrimination by voters).
89
90
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state constitution’s explicit protection.93 The Court’s analysis of
the process that had led to Section 26 informed its conclusions
about the amendment’s substance.
Resting on its theory that Section 26 created state action,
the Court did not explicitly address whether it thought voters’
approval of Section 26 at the ballot box had been driven by actual
invidious discriminatory purpose. But the opinion does contain
some hints in that direction. The Court drew heavily on two
opinions of the California Supreme Court, which Reitman
affirmed.94 The Justices described the California court as
“armed . . . with the knowledge of the facts and circumstances
concerning the passage and potential impact of [Section] 26,
and familiar with the milieu in which that provision would
operate.”95 This move allowed the Justices to gain the benefit of
the candor that the California court brought to its own
examination of Section 26 without overtly accusing California
voters of racism. For example, the California court tartly
observed that “if discrimination is . . . accomplished, the nature
of proscribed state action must not be limited by the ingenuity
of those who would seek to conceal it by subtleties and claims
of neutrality.”96
And so, although it is often overlooked as a restructuring
case,97 Reitman provides an important starting point for
considering the political restructuring doctrine’s core principles
and analytical framework. Reitman demonstrates that the Court
was aware that intentional discrimination might not always be
facial or obvious. It supports the principle that when a political
majority alters the ordinary lawmaking process in a way that
inflicts disadvantage on an identifiable minority group, such as
taking away statutorily created legal rights and preventing
their reinstatement, courts must take a closer look to better
understand the enactment’s “‘immediate objective,’ its ‘ultimate
effect’ and its ‘historical context and the conditions existing
prior to its enactment.’”98 A restructuring in and of itself is not
unconstitutional. But close, careful examination might reveal it
Reitman, 387 U.S. at 373, 375.
See id. at 372 (discussing Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1966);
Prendergast v. Snyder, 413 P.2d 847 (Cal. 1966)).
95 Id. at 378.
96 Mulkey, 413 P.2d at 834.
97 See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and
Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct.
1623, 1631 (2014) (plurality opinion) (observing that “[t]hough it has not been
prominent in the arguments of the parties, . . . [Reitman] is a proper beginning point
for discussing the controlling decisions”).
98 Reitman, 387 U.S. at 373 (quoting Reitman, 413 P.2d at 829).
93

94
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as “a form of sophisticated discrimination” that does violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
2. Hunter v. Erickson
In July 1964, the city council of Akron, Ohio, enacted an
ordinance forbidding housing discrimination “on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin or ancestry.”99 In a ballot initiative
four months later, the city’s voters amended the city charter to
repeal that ordinance and to require that any such fair housing
legislation in the future “first be approved by a majority of the
electors voting on the question at a regular or general election.”100
In Hunter v. Erickson,101 the second major case in the
restructuring line, the Court struck down the Akron charter
amendment as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
a. The Akron Charter Amendment as a Restructuring
Like the California state constitutional amendment in
Reitman, the Akron city charter amendment was a restructuring:
it selectively repealed an existing antidiscrimination law passed
by a representative legislative body and committed the issue to a
higher, more remote level of government (the city charter),
thereby making it far more difficult for the law’s beneficiaries and
supporters to reenact such legislation in the future. Under
existing city law, Akron voters could simply have repealed the fair
housing ordinance that their city council had passed.102 But they
chose to go further by forbidding any such future legislation.
Unlike California’s Section 26, which was cloaked in
supposedly neutral language about property rights, the Akron
charter amendment specifically addressed itself to housing
regulations involving “race, color, religion, ancestry or national
origin.”103 On its face, the law treated “Negro and white . . . in
an identical manner.”104 Thus, there was no automatic warrant
for strict scrutiny—truly neutral laws of general applicability
receive only the most deferential form of rational basis review.
But the Supreme Court thought that a closer examination was
needed because “the reality” was that the impact of the
restructuring “falls on the minority.”105 That was because
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 386-87 (1969).
Id. at 387 (quoting Akron City Charter § 137).
Id. at 385.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 386 (quoting Akron Ordinance No. 873-1964 § 1).
Id. at 391.
Id.
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supporters of fair housing laws—which the Court must
reasonably have assumed included most black city residents—
would have to run a special “gauntlet” and thus find it
“substantially more difficult” to reenact them.106 Consequently,
the Court reasoned, Akron’s voters had placed a “special burden[ ]
on racial minorities within the governmental process.”107 The
restructuring’s suspicious effect in itself did not violate the
Constitution, but it would cause the Court to more closely
examine its intents and purposes.
Justice Harlan expanded on this theme in a
concurrence. Most laws, he observed, “are designed with the
aim of providing a just framework within which the diverse
political groups in our society may fairly compete and are not
enacted with the purpose of assisting one particular group in
its struggle with its political opponents.”108 Where truly neutral
principles apply, the political marketplace “will sometimes
operate in favor of one faction; sometimes in favor of another.”109
The burden of having to amend a city charter or a state
constitution is not in itself constitutionally suspicious, as long
as the burden is not selectively imposed based on a characteristic
like race. If the fair housing ordinance had simply lost in a
referendum that was part of the ordinary processes of city
government, the city’s black residents “would undoubtedly lose
an important political battle, but they would not thereby be
denied equal protection.”110 But the actual situation here was
different, Justice Harlan said, because “the charter amendment
is discriminatory on its face.”111
b. The Akron Charter Amendment as a Classification
Actually, on its face, the Akron charter amendment did
not mandate differential treatment for persons of different
races. What it did do was mandate differential treatment—a
new “gauntlet” and “special burden”—for those wishing to see
the city maintain policies that prevented racial discrimination.
And since blacks, not whites, were the obvious beneficiaries of
such policies, “the reality,” the Court thought, was that the
restructuring’s “impact falls on the minority.”112 The Court
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 393 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 394.
Id.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 391 (majority opinion).
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called the amendment “an explicitly racial classification
treating racial housing matters differently from other racial
and housing matters.”113
The Court’s use of the word “classification” seems
significant, signaling that the Justices saw the disproportionate
impact on minority interests as intentional. “To classify” is, after
all, to engage in a conscious process of sorting and line
drawing. The Akron charter amendment was constitutionally
repugnant not because it had an incidental disadvantageous
effect on blacks, but because, in design and operation, the
Court believed the amendment was intended to create an
“official distinction[ ] based on race.”114 In Hunter, as in
Reitman, the Court’s analysis of the political process surrounding
a restructuring led it to a conclusion about why the enactment
produced a substantive constitutional violation. As in Reitman,
the Court apparently thought that the charter amendment in
Hunter represented the official validation and facilitation of
private prejudice, even if it did not say this in so many words.115
Hunter is an example of a case where the Court found a
“classification” based on something other than facial classification
of persons according to their race. But it was not the first time
the Court had done so, and it would not be the last. The Court
analogized the Akron charter amendment to a Louisiana
election law, struck down in Anderson v. Martin,116 which
required that a candidate’s race be specified on the ballot.117
There the Court had also found what it called a “classification,”118
even though on its face the state was not treating blacks and
whites differently—both had their race specified on the ballot.
But the social and historical context of the law mattered; this
was, after all, the Deep South in the 1960s. “[B]y placing a
racial label on a candidate at the most crucial stage in the
electoral process,” the Court reasoned in Anderson, “the State
furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused
as to operate against one group because of race and for
another.”119 The constitutional problem with the racial-label
Id. at 389.
Id. at 391.
115 Accord Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 191 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Hunter for the proposition that the
Court “has condemned significant state involvement in racial discrimination, however
subtle and indirect it may have been and whatever form it may have taken” (citing
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296 (1966); Hunter, 393 U.S. 385))).
116 Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
117 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391 (citing Anderson, 375 U.S. 399).
118 Anderson, 375 U.S. at 402.
119 Id.
113
114
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law was that it placed “the power of the State behind a racial
classification that induces racial prejudice at the polls.”120
The Hunter Court also analogized the Akron charter
amendment to cases where it had struck down laws “denying
[racial minorities] the vote, on an equal basis with others.”121
And to make the point even more bluntly, the Court worked in
citations to a battery of other landmark race cases that had
dealt with laws commonly understood to have been designed to
perpetuate white supremacy,122 including Loving v. Virginia
(marriage regulations),123 McLaughlin v. Florida (interracial
cohabitation),124 Bolling v. Sharpe (de jure school segregation),125
and Strauder v. West Virginia (exclusion of blacks from juries).126
Given its invocation of these cases, it seems fair to
conclude that the use of the term “classification” signaled that
the Court thought the Akron political restructuring was a form
of intentional discrimination against blacks as a racial group,
not just a political choice that happened to incidentally affect
policies that were favored by or beneficial to blacks. In a later
decision, the Court would say that the groups injured by
Hunter’s referendum requirement for new fair housing laws
were “presumptively racial minorities.”127 To be sure, the
Justices did not say that the supporters of the Akron charter
amendment had employed messages of white supremacy or other
forms of overtly racist appeal. But by invoking Anderson—and
thus in effect analogizing the events in Akron to the
machinations of white supremacists in the Deep South—as
well as other cases that involved infamous examples of naked
racial discrimination, the Hunter Court took a substantial step
in that direction. As Cass Sunstein has observed about Hunter,
“When the government puts in a separate category legislation
that protects minority group members and imposes a special
disability on those who seek such legislation, it is a reasonable
inference that invidious purposes are at work.”128
Id.
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391 (citing, inter alia, Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S.
474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960)).
122 Id. at 391-92 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71
(1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 344-45 (1880); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967)).
123 Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
124 McLaughlin, 379 U.S. 184.
125 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
126 Strauder, 100 U.S. 303.
127 Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 458 U.S. 527, 541 (1982).
128 Sunstein, supra note 43, at 148.
120
121
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3. Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1
In the late 1970s, the Seattle public schools decided to
address persistent racial segregation by implementing a
program of mandatory busing.129 A group opposed to busing,
called the Citizens for Voluntary Integration Committee, or
“CiVIC,” sued in state court to stop the busing program.130
Unsuccessful in that forum, the group turned its energies to a
statewide initiative, which came to be known as Initiative 350.
The initiative provided in part that “no school board . . . shall
directly or indirectly require any student to attend a school
other than the school which is geographically nearest or next
nearest the student’s place of residence . . . and which offers
the course of study pursued by such student.”131 In the 1978
statewide election, the initiative prevailed easily, garnering
66% of the vote.132
a. Initiative 350 as a Restructuring
In Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,133 the Court
had no difficulty seeing Initiative 350 as a political restructuring.
Although education is a state function and school districts are
creatures of state law, decisions on education policy in Seattle,
including matters involving student assignment and racial
desegregation, had always been “firmly committed to the local
board’s discretion.”134 The Court framed the move of busing
authority from the local to the state level as a matter of an
elected local school board seeking to “defend” its integration
program against an “attack by the State.”135 The restructuring
was more than a “‘mere repeal’ of a desegregation law by the
political entity that created it.”136 Instead, Initiative 350 made
substantially more difficult “all future attempts to integrate
Washington schools in districts throughout the State, by
lodging decisionmaking authority over the question at a new
and remote level of government”137—the classic definition of a
political restructuring.

129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 460 (1982).
Id. at 461-62.
Id. at 462 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.26.010 (1981)).
Id. at 463.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 479-80.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 483.
Id.
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Drawing on a point developed in Justice Harlan’s
Hunter concurrence, the Court emphasized that there is nothing
wrong with a state adopting “burdensome requirements for
amending state constitutions” even though such requirements
“may ‘make it more difficult for minorities to achieve favorable
legislation.’”138 As long as “every group” is subject to the same
burden—that is, as long as the “majority . . . restructure[s] the
political process to place obstacles in the path of everyone
seeking to secure the benefits of governmental action”—then
there is no equal protection problem.139 Seeming to echo Ely’s
principles that the “ins” cannot be allowed to manipulate the
lawmaking process so that “the outs will stay out”140 and so
that a “minority . . . keeps finding itself on the wrong end of
[lawmakers’] classifications, for reasons that in some sense are
discreditable,”141 the Court explained that “‘[i]f a governmental
institution is to be fair, one group cannot always be expected to
win[ ] ’; by the same token, one group cannot be subjected to a
debilitating and often insurmountable disadvantage.”142
Initiative 350 failed that test because it took busing
legislation away from “the usual legislative processes used for
comparable legislation” selectively—that is, only where the
matter involved busing intended to combat racial segregation.143
Thus, it “impose[d] direct and undeniable burdens on minority
interests.”144 Drawing on both the Hunter majority opinion and
Justice Harlan’s concurrence, the Seattle Court said that a
restructuring requires a “different analysis”—that is, higher
scrutiny—than ordinary legislation when it uses “the racial
nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking
process,”145 because doing so “places special burdens on racial
minorities.”146 An enactment becomes “constitutionally suspect”
where it “disadvantage[s a] particular group by making it more
difficult to enact legislation in its behalf.”147

138
139
140
141
142

omitted).
143
144
145
146
147

Id. at 470 (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 394 (1969)).
Id. (emphasis added).
ELY, supra note 1, at 103.
Id. at 152.
Seattle, 458 U.S. at 484 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 394) (citation
Id. at 483-84.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 470.
Id. (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. 385).
Id. at 468.
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In Schuette,148 the Sixth Circuit would read the language
in the above paragraph from Seattle (as have numerous
commentators, and as did four Justices in Schuette) as
triggering strict scrutiny based on a finding that a
restructuring has the effect of making it more difficult for a
minority to pursue its legislative agenda—that is, “to achieve
legislation that is in [its] interest” or “enact legislation in its
behalf.”149 The Sixth Circuit called this the Hunter/Seattle
“political-process doctrine” and described it as an alternative to
“traditional” equal protection analysis.150 But that understanding
only makes sense if the Seattle Court was troubled only by the
disparate racial effects of Initiative 350, and not on the
apparent intentions behind the initiative. A close reading of
Seattle supports the view that the Court saw Initiative 350 as a
form of intentional race discrimination.
b. Initiative 350 as a Classification
The Court found it to be “beyond reasonable
dispute . . . that the initiative was enacted ‘“because of,” not
merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon’” race-based busing.151
The Court saw more than just a good faith policy dispute about
the wisdom of busing. The large number of loopholes it contained
where busing remained permissible152 demonstrated that Initiative
350 was not, in fact, a neutral measure that merely had an
unintended or incidental impact on blacks; in fact, it was
“carefully tailored to interfere only with desegregative busing.”153
148 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and
Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,
701 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
149 Id. at 487.
150 Id. at 489 (“Having found that Proposal 2 deprives the Plaintiffs of equal
protection of the law under the political-process doctrine, we need not reach the
question of whether it also violates the Equal Protection Clause when assessed using
the ‘traditional’ analysis.”).
151 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (quoting
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
152 Id. at 462. The initiative contained a number of “broad exceptions” where
busing remained legal. For example, a student could be assigned beyond his or her
neighborhood school if the student

“require[d] special education, care or guidance,” or if “there are health or
safety hazards, either natural or man made, or physical barriers or
obstacles . . . between the student’s place of residence and the nearest or next
nearest school,” or if “the school nearest or next nearest to [the student’s]
place of residence is unfit or inadequate because of overcrowding, unsafe
conditions or lack of physical facilities.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.26.010 (1981)).
153 Id. at 471 (emphasis added).
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Despite the initiative’s purported purpose of preserving
neighborhood schools, “it is evident that the campaign focused
almost exclusively on the wisdom of ‘forced busing’ for
integration.”154 This made the initiative a “distinction[] based
on race,” because the only aspect of school busing policy that
was “singled out for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment”
was the aspect affecting the integration of black and white
students.155 “[D]espite its facial neutrality,” the Court said it
saw “little doubt” that Initiative 350 was “effectively drawn for
racial purposes.”156 For all these reasons, the Court concluded,
Initiative 350—like the Akron city charter amendment in
Hunter—created a “racial classification.”157
Since the text of Initiative 350 did not mention race, the
Court’s use of “classification” in this context strongly suggests
it saw an intention to disadvantage blacks as a group. Verbs
like “drawn,” “tailored,” and “singled out” indicate that the
Court thought the voters of Washington had made a conscious
choice to adopt a busing policy because of, not in spite of, its
anticipated effect of frustrating racial desegregation. To say
that the initiative was “drawn for racial purposes” suggests not
only that the initiative’s subject matter was race, but also that
its adverse racial impact was intentional, not incidental or
merely foreseeable. In other words, the Court seemed to think
that in banning race-based busing, the voters of Washington
were motivated by hostility toward busing as a remedy for
racial segregation. As Cass Sunstein has observed, the Court’s
“lengthy effort to show that such interference [was] extraordinary
as a matter of Washington law” signaled its “belief that highly
selective interference provides a substantial basis for fear that
an impermissible motive is at work.”158 Moreover, the Court
had held in an earlier case that a racial classification provides
grounds to “infer antipathy.”159 And so it seems difficult to
escape the conclusion that when the Court labeled Initiative
350 a “racial classification,” it was zeroing in on intentions, not
merely discriminatory effects.
Again, as in Hunter, the Court did not find a facial
classification of persons. Initiative 350 did not place all blacks
in a different legal category from all whites. But it targeted a
154 Id. at 463 (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp.
996, 1009 (W.D. Wash. 1979)).
155 Id. at 485 (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)).
156 Id. at 471 (emphasis added).
157 Id. at 471, 497-98.
158 Sunstein, supra note 43, at 164.
159 Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (emphasis added)
(quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).

2016]

RACE, RESTRUCTURINGS, AND EQUAL PROTECTION

1419

policy—desegregative busing—that the Court clearly understood
to be beneficial to blacks and that the Court undoubtedly
assumed was favored by many, if not most, of them. By calling it a
“racial classification” as well as a “meaningful and unjustified
official distinction[ ] based on race,”160 the Court was saying that
it thought those who had drafted and ratified Initiative 350
intended not just to consciously target busing, but also to
actively subvert the goals of integration and racial equality
that busing was supposed to promote.161 Even under
“traditional” equal protection, those are forbidden purposes.
Between Hunter in 1969 and Seattle in 1982, an
increasingly conservative Court had moved equal protection
doctrine in a more restrictive direction. In Washington v. Davis,162
it emphasized that only intentional discrimination, not merely the
racially disproportionate impact of a government policy, violates
the Fourteenth Amendment, though the Court was careful to note
that “an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred
from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact . . . that
the law bears more heavily on one race than another.”163 And in
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,164 the Court
held that the discriminatory effects of a law, even if such effects
were or could be anticipated by those drafting or approving the
law, do not render the law unconstitutional so long as the law
pursues a valid purpose.165 Feeney involved a state
employment preference for veterans that would have the
effect of benefitting far more men than women, but the Court
rejected the argument that this necessarily amounted to
unconstitutional sex discrimination. The Feeney Court
underscored that “the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
equal laws, not equal results.”166
The district court opinion in Seattle had examined
Initiative 350 in light of these cases, considering not only “[t]he
racially disproportionate impact of the initiative” but also “its
historical background, the sequence of events leading to its
Seattle, 458 U.S. at 486 (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
Accord Murray, supra note 25, at 452 (“It did not matter that some
proponents of racial busing were not minorities, nor was it fatal to the holding that
some minorities actually opposed the Seattle Plan. What mattered was the inescapable
inference that Initiative 350 disguised an anti-minority intent.” (footnote omitted)).
162 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause was not violated where blacks failed a government job test at a higher rate than
whites since there was no evidence that the test was biased or was anything other than
a neutral qualification for employment).
163 Id. at 242.
164 Feeney, 442 U.S. 256.
165 Id. at 257, 275-77.
166 Id. at 273.
160

161
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adoption and the departure from the procedural norm”—that
is, the restructuring—that it represented.167 From this record,
the district court concluded that, although it was “impossible to
ascertain the subjective intent of those who enacted Initiative
350” because “[i]t was a measure adopted by the electorate at
the ballot box,”168 nonetheless, from an objective standpoint, “a
racially discriminatory intent or purpose was at least one
motivating factor in the adoption of the initiative.”169 In
affirming, the Ninth Circuit analogized Initiative 350 to the
challenged city charter amendment in Hunter. It explained that
“Initiative 350 create[d a] differential classification indirectly by
omission” because it “treat[ed] a single purpose for student
assignment, racial balancing, differently from all others.”170 If
Initiative 350 were allowed to stand, “[l]awmakers who seek to
establish impermissible racial classifications will in the future be
able to achieve, by artfully worded statutes like Initiative 350,
constitutionally forbidden goals.”171 Although the Supreme Court
did not use language that was quite so pointed, its conclusions
may have been influenced by the lower courts’ analyses.
In response to an argument by the state, the Supreme
Court denied that Hunter had been effectively abrogated by
Washington and other intervening cases that refused to find
equal protection violations based on effects or disparate impact
alone. “Appellants unquestionably are correct when they suggest
that ‘purposeful discrimination,’” not simply disproportionate
effect, “is ‘the condition that offends the Constitution,’” it said.172
Logically, then, since the Court held Initiative 350
unconstitutional, it is hard to see how the Court could have
viewed the measure as anything other than “purposeful
discrimination.” The Court added, “We have not insisted on a
particularized inquiry into motivation in all equal protection
cases” because “[a] racial classification, regardless of purported
motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only
upon an extraordinary justification.”173
In other words, the finding of a racial classification and
a particularized finding of invidious purpose can be, analytically,
two different things, even though both involve intentional, and
167 Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp. 996, 1013-16 (W.D.
Wash. 1979).
168 Id. at 1013 (emphasis added).
169 Id. at 1016.
170 Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir. 1980).
171 Id.
172 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484 (1982) (quoting
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979)).
173 Id. at 485 (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272).
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thus impermissible, discrimination. The Court was, in effect,
denying the need to inquire into the subjective motivations—
that is, the individual motivations or racial attitudes—of the
people who had designed and approved Initiative 350. But
consideration of the objective circumstances surrounding a law’s
passage can still lead to the finding of a racial classification. As
Justice Stevens suggested in his concurring opinion in
Washington, “Frequently the most probative evidence of intent
will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather
than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the
actor.”174 After all, the Court in several past race cases had
found “racial classifications” without undertaking such an
investigation into motives. In Anderson, the Court did not
undertake a “particularized inquiry” into the subjective
motivations of the Louisiana legislators who had approved a law
requiring that a candidate’s race be specified on the ballot;
against the background of Louisiana racial politics and voter
attitudes, the law’s improper purpose seemed to speak for itself.
Similarly, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,175 the Court invalidated an
Alabama redistricting map that had “alter[ed] the shape of
Tuskegee from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided
figure.”176 The Court did not rely on any particularized inquiry
into the subjective motivations of those who drew the map in
determining that the map was, objectively, intended to work
purposeful discrimination—“that the legislation is solely
concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing
Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their preexisting municipal vote.”177 No one would suggest that Anderson
or Gomillion had been implicitly abrogated by Washington.
On the same day it decided Seattle, the Court also
decided Crawford v. Board of Education of Los Angeles.178 In
Crawford, the Court upheld a California state constitutional
amendment, Proposition I, that prohibited the state’s courts from
ordering school desegregation remedies that addressed de facto,
as opposed to de jure, segregation and thus went beyond the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said
that the Equal Protection Clause was not implicated by what
was, in effect, no more than a repeal of a policy enforced by state
courts. Proposition I did “not embody a racial classification”
because “[i]t neither says nor implies that persons are to be
174
175
176
177
178

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 341.
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
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treated differently on account of their race.”179 The Court
distinguished between “state action that discriminates on the
basis of race” and “state action that addresses, in neutral
fashion, race-related matters.” Proposition I was an example of
the latter, while presumably the Court thought Washington’s
Initiative 350 was an example of the former. The Court also
said that Proposition I did not “distort[ ] the political process
for racial reasons or . . . allocate[ ] governmental or judicial
power on the basis of a discriminatory principle”180—again,
presumably in contradistinction to the busing initiative in
Seattle. Proposition I also did not prevent local school boards
from adopting busing programs to address de facto segregation.
Cass Sunstein has suggested that the outcomes in Seattle and
Crawford can be reconciled because Proposition I in Crawford
“closely resembles a mere repeal,” whereas Initiative 350 in
Seattle was “a ‘repeal plus,’ a race-specific classification in the
form of a special burden on those who sought certain sorts of
actions from the local school board.”181
In sum, as with the city charter amendment in Hunter,
even if it could have more candidly or explicitly explained its
reasoning, the Court refused to believe that the Washington
busing ban had been enacted for legitimate, neutral purposes
but just happened to burden blacks with negative effects. Here,
“the political process or . . . decisionmaking mechanism” used to
address government policies aimed at remediating racial
discrimination and segregation had been “singled out for peculiar
and disadvantageous treatment.”182 The discriminatory intent
that the Court perceived to be behind the restructuring of the
political process created a substantive equal protection violation.
4. Romer v. Evans
In the 1980s and 1990s, gay and lesbian political groups
focused a substantial amount of their organizing and resources
on persuading state and local governments to pass laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
employment, housing, public accommodations, and other realms.183
These efforts frequently were met with backlash, as social and
Id. at 537.
Id. at 541.
181 Sunstein, supra note 43, at 159.
182 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982).
183 See, e.g., SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, QUEERS IN COURT: GAY RIGHTS LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY 59 (2007) (noting that “[b]y 1993, at least 139 jurisdictions had adopted
antidiscrimination policies” related to sexual orientation).
179

180
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religious conservatives mounted efforts to have the laws repealed,
often using ballot initiatives to do so.184 These campaigns
“established an environment that was distinctly suspicious of the
gay movement as militant, radical, contagious, unhealthy, and
essentially unfair.”185 In November 1992, voters in Colorado
approved Amendment 2, an amendment to the Colorado state
constitution that repealed gay-rights ordinances that had been
enacted in Aspen, Boulder, and Denver and prohibited any city,
or the state itself, from enacting such antidiscrimination legislation
in the future.186
a. Amendment 2 as a Restructuring
Amendment 2 was challenged in state court, and the
case eventually reached the Colorado Supreme Court. The
state Supreme Court drew heavily on Reitman, Hunter, and
Seattle, but also on a separate line of equal protection cases
concerning electoral district reapportionment, ballot access for
political parties, and the right to vote.187 From this diverse
group of cases, the Colorado court synthesized the rule that “the
Equal Protection Clause guarantees the fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process and that any attempt
to infringe on an independently identifiable group’s ability to
exercise that right is subject to strict judicial scrutiny.”188 In
specifying strict scrutiny, the Colorado court said it was relying
on Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,189 a case about
eligibility to vote in school board elections in which the Court
had held that “the deference usually given to the judgment of
legislators does not extend to decisions concerning [who] may
participate in the election of legislators and other public
See id.
Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, Romer v. Evans and the Amendment 2
Controversy: The Rhetoric and Reality of Sexual Orientation Discrimination in
America, 6 TEX. F. ON CIV. L. & CIV. RTS. 261, 273 (2002).
186 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). The full text of Amendment 2 read:
184
185

No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of
the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id. (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
187 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1276-80 (Colo. 1993).
188 Id. at 1276.
189 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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officials”190 and that rational basis review and its presumption of
constitutionality do not apply when a challenge involves whether
“the institutions of state government are structured so as to
represent fairly all the people.”191
In other words, the Colorado Supreme Court seemed to
believe that Amendment 2 had, in effect, disenfranchised gays
and lesbians. Based on the combined force of the restructuring
and election cases, it reasoned inductively to the broad
principle that “close judicial scrutiny” is required any time a
law “impairs a group’s ability to effectively participate . . . in
the process by which government operates.”192 This statement
is arguably consistent with the core principles of Footnote Four
and John Hart Ely, discussed in Section I.A.193 But it was an
ambitious synthesis of the Court’s precedents, stated at a high
level of abstraction, and it lacked clear standards and definitions.
Creative lawyers could no doubt come up with many ways to
argue that their clients had been impaired from “effective[ ]
participat[ion] . . . in the process by which government operates,”
and such a rule likely would have licensed a great deal more
roving judicial intervention into the lawmaking process than
the Justices were ready to accept.194 And so it was not
surprising that the U.S. Supreme Court took a somewhat
different approach.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Romer v. Evans195
politely declined to adopt the Colorado Supreme Court’s
analysis.196 But that does not mean Romer is not a political
restructuring case. It clearly is. Amendment 2 did not prevent
gays and lesbians from voting or engaging in political activity,
but it still restructured the political process to their clear
disadvantage: it selectively changed the rules under which the
political/lawmaking system dealt with a particular policy
question (antidiscrimination laws related to sexual orientation,
which had been within the power of municipal governments
and the state legislature to enact), moving the question to a
higher, more remote level of government.197 As the Court
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
192 Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277.
193 See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
194 Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277.
195 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
196 Id. at 626 (“We . . . now affirm the judgment, but on a rationale different
from that adopted by the State Supreme Court.”).
197 Accord Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and
Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct.
1623, 1671 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court did not apply the political190

191
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emphasized, Amendment 2 thus “withdr[ew] from homosexuals,
but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by
discrimination,” and “it forb[ade] reinstatement of these laws and
policies.”198 It put gays and lesbians in a “solitary class.”199 All this
was achieved by altering the ordinary political process—by
taking the issue of gay/lesbian antidiscrimination laws away
from the regular state or local lawmaking processes and placing it
in the state constitution. It would be hard to imagine a purer
example of the kind of political-process problem that concerned
Ely: “the ins . . . choking off the channels of political change to
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out.”200
The operation and effects of Amendment 2 as a
restructuring informed the Court’s view about why it required
close scrutiny rather than the default presumption of
constitutionality. Gays and lesbians were not a suspect class, and
so discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would
normally have called for only the most deferential form of rational
basis review. But the Court found that the “disqualification of a
class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the
law”—that is, the effect of Amendment 2 as a restructuring—was
“unprecedented,” an “unusual” form of discrimination that
required “careful consideration.”201
b. Amendment 2 as Unconstitutional Animus
This careful consideration revealed that the “[s]weeping”202
disadvantages Amendment 2 placed on gays and lesbians were far
out of proportion to the state’s purported justifications for them
(to wit, respecting the liberties of landlords or employers with
personal or religious objections to homosexuality and conserving
resources to fight discrimination against other groups).203
Amendment 2’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it,” the Court said, “that the amendment
seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward” gays and
lesbians.204 This was the rare rational basis case where a law
“lack[ed] a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”205
process doctrine in Romer, the case resonates with the principles undergirding the
political-process doctrine.” (footnote omitted)).
198 Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
199 Id.
200 ELY, supra note 1, at 103.
201 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277
U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)).
202 Id. at 627.
203 Id. at 635.
204 Id. at 632.
205 Id.
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Such “[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult
for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the
government is itself,” the Court said, “a denial of equal protection
of the laws in the most literal sense.”206
The Court’s conclusion of “animus” was deductive,
because no other explanation made sense. In Romer, as in the
previous restructuring cases, the Court did not go on a search
for subjective discriminatory intent or invidious purpose among
the voters who had approved Amendment 2. Rather, animus
could be inferred as an objective matter because the measure’s
harmful effects on gays and lesbians far outran its purported
justifications.207 Even under rational basis review, when a law’s
obvious harmful effects for a particular group are “far removed
from [its] particular justifications,” a court will not “credit”
those justifications.208
In short, even though it eschewed the reasoning of the
Colorado state courts that had relied on Reitman, Hunter, and
Seattle, among other decisions, Romer fits within the political
restructuring line of cases. Confronted with a situation where a
restructuring had taken away rights and forbidden their
reinstatement, the Court gave the matter, from the outset,
something more rigorous than ordinary rational basis review.
After considering the restructuring’s evident effects, the Court
concluded that it violated equal protection because it had been
accomplished with a purpose “not to further a proper legislative
end but to make [gays and lesbians] unequal to everyone else”
and to deem the class “a stranger to its laws.”209 Once more, in
the Court’s analysis, process and substance were inextricable.

Id. at 633.
Be that as it may, there was no shortage of information available about the
homophobia and animus that had propelled the Amendment 2 campaign, and it is
difficult to imagine that the Justices, relatively cloistered though they may be, were
not aware of it. In the Colorado courts, “the state’s position was that Amendment 2 was
essential to avoid the effects of a ‘militant gay aggression’ in validating a ‘homosexual
agenda,’” and many of the state’s rationales “appeared to be based on blatant prejudice.”
MEZEY, supra note 183, at 61. Antigay hostility was so common and so passionate that “the
president of the University of Colorado was forced to wear a bulletproof vest while
addressing a gathering of lesbians and gay men because of threats on his life for
addressing what had been termed a ‘fag rally’ by one opponent.” LISA KEEN & SUZANNE
B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL 119 (2000); see also
Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89,
90 (1997) (arguing that “[t]he Court’s inference of unconstitutional animus was central to its
holding” in Romer).
208 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
209 Id.
206

207
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Proposal 2 made Michigan one of eight states to ban
affirmative action in public university admissions and other
state functions.210 Six of these bans, including Michigan’s, were
adopted by voters.211 The first was California’s Proposition 209,
approved in 1996 after a campaign led by Ward Connerly, a
black former regent of the University of California, who gained
fame for his vigorous activism against affirmative action.212
Michigan’s Proposal 2 was a direct response to the Court’s 2003
decision in Grutter v. Bollinger,213 which involved the admissions
policy at the University of Michigan Law School and held that the
Equal Protection Clause allows narrowly tailored use of race in
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in
obtaining the educational benefits of a diverse student body.
The lead proponent and spokesperson for Proposal 2 was
Jennifer Gratz, who had been involved in anti-affirmative-action
activism and litigation since she was rejected as an
undergraduate by the University of Michigan in the mid-1990s.214
Michigan voters adopted Proposal 2 in the November 2006
election by a vote of 58% to 42%.215 Exit polls showed that
Proposal 2 was supported by 59% of whites but only 14% of
blacks.216 Proposal 2 was a restructuring because it took authority
over race-conscious admissions policies away from its normal
locus in Michigan government—popularly elected university
boards of regents217—and placed it in the state constitution.
210 Drew Desilver, Supreme Court Says States Can Ban Affirmative Action; 8
Already Have, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/0
4/22/supreme-court-says-states-can-ban-affirmative-action-8-already-have/ [http://perma.cc/
9SRE-ZTE5].
211 Id.
212 California Affirmative Action, Proposition 209 (1996), BALLOTPEDIA, http://
ballotpedia.org/California_Affirmative_Action,_Proposition_209_%281996%29 [http://perma.
cc/38XA-SM2G] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
213 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
214 Maggie Severns, Woman Who Killed Affirmative Action, POLITICO (Apr. 22,
2014, 5:31 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/jennifer-gratz-affirmative-actionmichigan-105913.html [http://perma.cc/QJ36-8CZL].
215 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F.
Supp. 2d 924, 931 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
216 Scott Jaschik, Michigan Votes Down Affirmative Action, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Nov. 8, 2006), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/08/michigan [http://perma.cc/
3YLV-XVWN].
217 For example, the eight members of the Board of Regents of the University
of Michigan are elected in biennial statewide elections. Regents of the University of
Michigan, UNIV. OF MICH., http://www.regents.umich.edu/ [http://perma.cc/R4J5-26MN]
(last visited June 2, 2016).
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Two separate challenges to Proposal 2 were filed in federal
district court, one by a group of organizations and individuals led
by the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, and
Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means
Necessary (the “Coalition plaintiffs”), and a second by 18
students, prospective students, and professors at the University
of Michigan.218 On March 18, 2008, Judge David Lawson
dismissed the suits, holding that Proposal 2 did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.219
On July 1, 2011, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court, relying primarily on Hunter and
Seattle to hold that Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it “modifie[d] Michigan’s political process ‘to
place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to
achieve beneficial legislation.’”220 The panel rejected the state’s
argument that “a reallocation of political decisionmaking violates
the Equal Protection Clause only if the Plaintiffs can demonstrate
it was motivated by purposeful racial discrimination.”221 Rather,
the panel thought strict scrutiny was triggered as long as a
measure “restructures the political process along racial lines
and places special burdens on racial minorities.”222 Since the
state did not argue that Proposal 2 served a compelling interest,
the panel held that it violated the Equal Protection Clause. The
panel opinion was vacated when the full Sixth Circuit granted
en banc review.
On November 15, 2012, the majority opinion for a
deeply divided Sixth Circuit sitting en banc reached the same
conclusion as the earlier panel, on essentially the same
reasoning: that Hunter and Seattle together represented a
special category of equal protection analysis—“the politicalprocess doctrine”223—which applies when an enactment “(1) has
a racial focus, targeting a policy or program that ‘inures
primarily to the benefit of the minority’; and (2) reallocates
political power or reorders the decisionmaking process in a way
that places special burdens on a minority group’s ability to
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 933-34.
Id. at 960.
220 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and
Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,
652 F.3d 607, 631 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. 457, 467 (1982)).
221 Id. at 630.
222 Id. at 630-31.
223 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and
Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,
701 F.3d 466, 488-89 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
218
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achieve its goals through that process.”224 Having found these
criteria satisfied, the court said it was unnecessary to analyze
Proposal 2 under “traditional” equal protection analysis, which
would require the finding of a racial classification or
discriminatory purpose or intent.225
B.

The Supreme Court’s Plurality Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s
judgment on the constitutionality of Michigan’s Proposal 2, but
the Court was unable to coalesce around a majority opinion.
Justice Kennedy wrote for a plurality of himself, Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justice Alito.226 Justices Scalia and Breyer each
filed opinions concurring in the judgment (and Justice Thomas
joined Justice Scalia’s opinion).227 Justice Sotomayor, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, dissented.228 Chief Justice Roberts filed a
brief concurrence that is not relevant to the discussion here.229
Justice Kagan had recused herself and did not participate.
The plurality opinion identified Reitman, Hunter, and
Seattle as the relevant precedents. (It did not mention Romer.)
But the opinion did not address the phenomenon of political
restructurings generally, or even acknowledge Proposal 2 as being
one. Nor did it refer explicitly to a Hunter/Seattle doctrine.
Essentially, the plurality approached Schuette as a case to be
addressed by applying what it called the Court’s “settled equal
protection jurisprudence” on race.230 In the plurality’s view,
Proposal 2 enacted a public policy on a question that was
within the state’s competency to decide for itself: whether or
not to practice the limited race-conscious affirmative action
that Grutter allows but does not require. The plurality did not
think Proposal 2 enacted a racial classification. Rather, it saw
Proposal 2 simply as evidence that Michigan had engaged in

Id. at 477 (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 467).
Id. at 473.
226 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1624
(2014) (plurality opinion).
227 Id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1648 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
228 Id. at 1651 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 1638 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice’s two-paragraph
concurring opinion took issue with various statements in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent
advocating for the continued need to take race into account in college admissions. Id. at
1638-39.
230 Id. at 1634 (plurality opinion).
224

225
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“innovation and experimentation” on a “contested and complex
policy question among and within States.”231
The plurality characterized Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle
as cases that all involved, in one form or another, intentional
discrimination on the basis of race (though it discussed and
dissected these cases in far less detail than provided here in
Section II.B). In Reitman, it said, the California constitutional
amendment “expressly authorized and constitutionalized the
private right to discriminate”232 and “significantly encourage[d]
and involve[d] the State in private racial discriminations.”233
Reitman was a case where “the state action in question
encouraged discrimination, causing real and specific injury.”234
This explanation largely tracked the explanation given in
Reitman itself.
Moving on to Hunter, the plurality found it significant
that Akron’s fair housing ordinance had originally been approved
amid circumstances of “widespread racial discrimination,”
causing segregation that “forc[ed] many to live in ‘unhealthful,
unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded conditions.’”235 The city
charter amendment repealing this ordinance was “targeted” at a
racial matter that the city council had been attempting to
address, “singling out antidiscrimination ordinances.”236 Thus, it
was “as impermissible as any other government action taken
with the invidious intent to injure a racial minority.”237 Hunter’s
facts, the plurality said, “established that invidious discrimination
would be the necessary result of the procedural restructuring.”238
The plurality thought that the amendment was different from the
sort of enactment that foreseeably harms a group as a matter of
collateral effect but remains constitutional because its primary
motivation is the pursuit of a permissible purpose.239 Rather than
grapple with how the Hunter Court had found the city charter
amendment to have been a “classification,” the Schuette plurality
explicitly characterized the amendment as having been motivated
by “invidious intent.”240
Coming to Seattle, the plurality noted that the
Washington initiative had been “carefully tailored to interfere
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

Id. at 1630.
Id. at 1631 (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967)).
Id. (quoting Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381).
Id.
Id. at 1632 (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1632.
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only with desegregative busing.”241 But Justice Kennedy offered
a somewhat different rationale than the Seattle Court itself had
given for striking down the initiative. After describing the
backdrop of racial school segregation in Seattle at the time,
Justice Kennedy said that Initiative 350 violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it created “an aggravation” of a
preexisting “racial injury”—segregated schools—“in which the
State itself was complicit.”242 “Seattle is best understood,” the
plurality opined, “as a case in which the state action in question
(the bar on busing enacted by the State’s voters) had the
serious risk, if not purpose, of causing specific injuries on
account of race, just as had been the case in [Reitman] and
Hunter.”243 Justice Scalia was perhaps not wrong in
characterizing this reading of Seattle as “cloudy and doctrinally
anomalous.”244 But in any event, the plurality recognized the
restructuring in Seattle as causing “specific injuries from hostile
discrimination”245 that are cognizable under “traditional” equal
protection analysis.
The plurality did not directly engage with the Sixth
Circuit’s discussion of a “Hunter/Seattle” or “political-process
doctrine” concerning restructurings. But it effectively pulled the
rug out from under such an analysis by emphasizing that Seattle
did not create a new category of equal protection violation where a
plaintiff need show only that a political restructuring
detrimentally affects a policy that “inures primarily to the
benefit of the minority.”246 This language from Seattle, the
plurality said, appeared to sweep in “any state action with a
‘racial focus’ that makes it ‘more difficult for certain racial
minorities than for other groups’ to ‘achieve legislation that is in
their interest.’”247 And that, the Court said, proved too much. Such
an “expansive reading of Seattle has no principled limitation and
raises serious questions of compatibility with the Court’s
settled equal protection jurisprudence.”248 Seattle, the plurality
said, should not be “read to require the Court to determine and
declare which political policies serve the ‘interest’ of a group
defined in racial terms.”249 Such reasoning, the plurality claimed,
241

471 (1982)).
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249

Id. at 1633 (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457,
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1640 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1634.
Id. (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 472).
Id. (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 470).
Id.
Id.
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“was unnecessary to the decision in Seattle; it has no support in
precedent; and it raises serious constitutional concerns.”250
In the plurality’s view, Michigan’s Proposal 2 was
constitutional because, unlike the events in Reitman, Hunter, and
Seattle, “[h]ere there was no infliction of a specific injury” based
on race.251 In other words, the plurality thought that a voter
initiative that prohibited affirmative action could not be
considered an intentional racial classification or assumed to
have been impelled by invidious purpose. The plurality opinion
treated it as self-evident that a measure prohibiting affirmative
action could not have involved the sorts of racial dynamics that
troubled the Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle Courts.
C.

The Concurrences and Dissent

The five Justices not in the plurality came to starkly
varying conclusions about the issues raised by Proposal 2.
Unlike the plurality, they all acknowledged a “political-process
doctrine” arising from Hunter and Seattle. But they did so with
different levels of conviction and from very different perspectives.
Justice Breyer wrote briefly to concur in the judgment.252
He appeared to recognize the existence of the “Hunter/Seattle
doctrine” as an exception to traditional equal protection
principles.253 But he concluded that the doctrine did not apply in
the circumstances of Schuette because, in his view, Proposal 2
did “not involve a reordering of the political process; it does not in
fact involve the movement of decisionmaking from one political
level to another.”254 That was because in Michigan, affirmative
action had been implemented not by statute but by universities
acting administratively under authority delegated by their
elected boards of regents.255 No other Justice pursued this
understanding of the case.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also concurred in
the judgment that Proposal 2 did not violate equal protection.256
The key difference between the plurality and Justice Scalia was
that the plurality did not believe that the Sixth Circuit’s
reliance on the Hunter/Seattle doctrine represented the only
Id.
Id. at 1636.
252 Id. at 1648 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
253 See id. at 1650 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that
“the parties do not here suggest that [Proposal 2] violates the Equal Protection Clause
if not under the Hunter-Seattle doctrine”).
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
250
251
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possible reading of those two cases. By contrast, Scalia excoriated
the “so-called political-process doctrine,”257 because, in his view,
Hunter and Seattle are outliers in equal protection jurisprudence
that “endorse[ ] a version of the proposition that a facially
neutral law may deny equal protection solely because it has a
disparate racial impact,” in violation of Washington v. Davis.258
In Hunter and Seattle, he charged, the Court had “deemed the
[restructuring] an equal-protection violation regardless of
whether it facially classified according to race or reflected an
invidious purpose to discriminate.”259
According to Justice Scalia’s reading, the Hunter Court
did not find that the Akron city charter amendment “target[ed]
racial minorities.” Rather, it “bypass[ed] the question of intent
entirely, satisfied that its newly minted political-process theory
sufficed to invalidate the charter amendment.”260 Similarly, he
seemed to ignore the Seattle Court’s characterization of
Initiative 350 as “purposeful discrimination”261 and asserted
that the Court had found the initiative unconstitutional only
because “it removed ‘the authority to address a racial
problem . . . from the existing decisionmaking body, in such a way
as to burden minority interests.’”262 For these reasons, Justice
Scalia said, “Hunter and Seattle should be overruled,” because
they are “[p]atently atextual, unadministrable, and contrary to
our traditional equal-protection jurisprudence.”263
In a lengthy and impassioned dissent, Justice Sotomayor,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, also claimed, similarly to Justice
Scalia, that Hunter and Seattle did not address whether the
enactments in those cases “reflected an invidious purpose to
discriminate.”264 Articulating the conventional understanding of
the Hunter/Seattle doctrine, she argued that “[t]he presence (or
absence) of invidious discrimination has no place in” restructuring
analysis because the doctrine “operates irrespective of
discriminatory intent, for it protects a process-based right.”265
The equal protection holdings in Hunter and Seattle were
based, she said, on the fact that the enactments “reconfigure[d]
Id. at 1640.
Id. at 1647.
259 Id. at 1641.
260 Id. at 1642.
261 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484 (1982) (quoting
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979)).
262 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1641 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474).
263 Id. at 1643.
264 Id. at 1663 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
265 Id. at 1663 n.8.
257
258
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the political process to the detriment of racial minorities”266 and
singled out policies related to race “for peculiar and
disadvantageous treatment.”267 But whereas Justice Scalia saw
this as a reason to repudiate Hunter and Seattle, Justice
Sotomayor saw it as a reason to celebrate them. Justice
Sotomayor concluded that the Court’s judgment “eviscerates an
important strand of our equal protection jurisprudence.”268
IV.

SITUATING SCHUETTE WITHIN THE COURT’S EQUAL
PROTECTION DOCTRINE

Schuette’s lack of a majority opinion, the plurality’s
failure to expressly confront the Hunter/Seattle doctrine on
which the Sixth Circuit had relied, and the unwillingness of
any of the Justices to candidly confront what role voters’ racial
attitudes might have played in the adoption of Proposal 2 all
make the case an uneasy fit with the restructuring precedents
that came before it. In an effort to make some sense of the
decision, this part of the article advances two doctrinal
arguments about Schuette. First, the Court was correct to
reverse the judgment of the Sixth Circuit, because the
Hunter/Seattle doctrine as understood by the circuit court did
not have a sufficiently strong basis in the Supreme Court’s own
equal protection cases. Second, the outcome in Schuette is a
logical extension of the Court’s current racial equal protection
jurisprudence, which is skeptical of affirmative action and
denies as a matter of law that racial groups are capable of
having distinct policy preferences.
A.

The Tenuous Existence of the Hunter/Seattle Doctrine

The conventional understanding of Hunter and Seattle,
represented in the opinions of both Justice Scalia and Justice
Sotomayor, was that the cases created a special category of
equal protection law for certain political restructurings. A
plaintiff could establish a constitutional claim without showing a
facial classification or proof of invidious intent as long as the
restructuring had both a “racial focus” and the effect of
disadvantaging the interests of a racial minority group. Consistent
with this view, Vikram Amar and Evan Caminker have
distinguished what they call the “Hunter framework” from
266
267
268

Id. at 1663.
Id. at 1674 (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 485).
Id. at 1683.
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“conventional equal protection analysis,”269 though they
acknowledge that the restructuring cases are “controversial”
because “[t]he laws in question did not expressly single out
minorities at all, but instead singled out issues that the Court
deemed to be of particular interest to minorities.”270
In Schuette, the Court’s plurality did not acknowledge a
Hunter/Seattle doctrine by name, but it effectively rejected the
idea of such a doctrine by saying that the Sixth Circuit had
read Seattle too expansively. The plurality characterized both
Hunter and Seattle as compatible with conventional equal
protection analysis. When the plurality opinion is joined with
Justice Scalia’s concurrence for himself and Justice Thomas,
the Court’s judgment effectively announced the demise of the
Hunter/Seattle doctrine as a distinct category of equal
protection analysis.
All of this raises the question: Did a Hunter/Seattle
doctrine ever really exist in the first place? The plurality
avoided discussing that question.271 But its reading of Seattle
left no room for the sort of Hunter/Seattle analysis that had
prevailed in the Sixth Circuit. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, thought that such a doctrine had existed but that the
plurality had not gone far enough to bury it. Justice Sotomayor,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, also thought that the doctrine had
existed but that the Court’s judgment had “eviscerate[d]” it.272
The better view is that the Hunter/Seattle doctrine
never actually had a viable existence. The extended analysis of
the restructuring cases that came before Schuette in Section
II.B demonstrated that these cases all involved one form or
another of what the Court viewed as intentional discrimination.
In the Court’s view, the constitutional violations in those cases
did not arise merely from the incidental effects or disparate
impacts on minority groups of some otherwise legitimate
government undertaking. For all of those restructurings, the
Court believed that intentional discrimination was part and
parcel of their purpose and design. If this reading is correct,
then the restructuring cases before Schuette are consistent
269 Amar & Caminker, supra note 25, at 1022, 1024; see also GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 542 (4th ed. 2001) (noting that “the statute
invalidated in Seattle nowhere mentioned race” and questioning whether Seattle is
consistent with Davis).
270 Amar & Caminker, supra note 25, at 1027.
271 Accord Mark Strasser, Schuette, Electoral Process Guarantees, and the
New Neutrality, 94 NEB. L. REV. 60, 99 (2015) (“While resisting Justice Scalia’s call to
overrule the doctrine, the plurality applied a doctrine without explaining what it is or
how it works.” (footnote omitted)).
272 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1683 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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with “traditional” equal protection doctrine. Accordingly, this
article’s analysis contradicts the proposition that there has
existed a separate “Hunter/Seattle doctrine” where an equal
protection violation would arise only from the negative effects
that a restructuring has on a minority group, rather than from
purpose and intention.
In Hunter, recall, the Court called the Akron city
charter amendment an “official distinction[ ] based on race”273
and implicitly analogized it to cases involving some of the most
notorious forms of intentional race discrimination.274 Two
Justices in Hunter stated explicitly that they thought the
Akron city charter amendment had been enacted for “the clear
purpose of making it more difficult for certain racial and
religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their
interest.”275 Just seven years after Hunter, in Washington v.
Davis, the Court would underscore that its “cases have not
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act . . . is
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact” and that “the invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose.”276 The Court gave no indication in
Washington that it was repudiating or intending to disturb Hunter.
Furthermore, in Seattle, the Court said that it had
“little doubt that [Initiative 350] was effectively drawn for
racial purposes”277 and created a “meaningful and unjustified
official distinction[ ] based on race.”278 While Initiative 350 was
ostensibly a measure to preserve the principle of neighborhood
schools, in fact it allowed for so many exceptions that it was not
neutral. Instead, it selectively blocked local school district busing
policies only where those policies were aimed at remediating
racial segregation. The initiative had been “carefully tailored to
interfere only with desegregative busing.”279 To say something is
“carefully tailored” is necessarily to say that it was done with
conscious intent. Moreover, the Seattle Court affirmed
categorically that “purposeful discrimination is ‘the condition
that offends the Constitution,’” and nowhere in the opinion did
it say that it was creating an exception to that rule.280 A law
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
See supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
275 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
276 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
277 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982).
278 Id. at 486 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391).
279 Id. at 471.
280 Id. at 484 (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979)).
273

274
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with a purpose and design of neutral, constitutionally
permissible objectives but that incidentally burdened blacks in
their political goals—even if the incidental burden could be
anticipated ahead of time—could not be said to have been
“drawn for racial purposes.”281 The Court was not (as
proponents of the Hunter/Seattle doctrine would see it) merely
invalidating a procedural change with effects that happened to
burden minority interests. The Court said that it was “beyond
reasonable dispute . . . that the initiative was enacted ‘“because
of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon’ busing
for integration.”282
Of course, opposition to desegregative busing might be
held as a good faith policy view and need not be driven by
racial animus.283 But the Court never indicated that it thought
the purpose was merely a good faith disagreement about
busing. Rather, the Court perceived the debate to have been
about the merits of racial integration itself. The Court believed
that the purpose and design of the restructuring was to
disadvantage blacks as a class. The Court observed somewhat
archly that the initiative’s sponsors had no “difficulty perceiving
the racial nature of the issue settled by Initiative 350.”284 The
Court’s use of the term “racial purposes” in this context cannot
mean anything other than intentionally race-conscious action.
The key point of the Hunter/Seattle doctrine, according
to Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Schuette, is that it “operates
irrespective of discriminatory intent, for it protects a processbased right.”285 But this understanding seems plainly incorrect
in light of this article’s exposition of those two cases. A close
reading of Hunter and Seattle, together with some reasonable
inferences from the Court’s language, its tone, and the social
history of the times when the cases were decided, supports the
conclusion that (1) the Court did see the restructurings in both
of those cases as the products of intentional discrimination, and
(2) the analysis of the process problems in these cases (that is,
their character as restructurings) was inextricably intertwined
with the analysis of the substantive equal protection
violations. The process irregularities led the Court to examine
Id. at 471.
Id. (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279) (emphasis added).
283 Sunstein, supra note 43, at 157 (“Opposition to busing for purposes of
racial balance is different from opposition to antidiscrimination legislation [as in
Hunter], because it is more easily supportable with noninvidious justifications.”).
284 Seattle, 458 U.S. at 471.
285 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1663
n.8 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
281
282
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facts and circumstances more carefully than it otherwise
might have done, and this examination ultimately persuaded
the Court that the challenged enactments amounted to raceconscious decisionmaking.286
A significant weakness of Hunter and Seattle as judicial
opinions—and likely the reason why some jurists and
commentators have failed to acknowledge them as cases about
intentional discrimination—is the Court’s relative delicacy and
indirection about the racial dynamics behind the challenged
measures in those cases. The Hunter and Seattle opinions can
be criticized for the Court’s apparent unwillingness to be more
forthcoming and candid about the racial prejudice it perceived
behind the restructurings. By invoking the term “racial
classification” in both cases, the Court categorized the
discrimination as intentional, but in both cases it largely failed
to discuss candidly the basis for that conclusion. Thus, a
certain amount of reading between the lines is necessary to
appreciate why the Court believed that these enactments
violated equal protection as traditionally understood.
Other scholars who have examined these cases have
reached a range of conclusions. Amar and Caminker have
acknowledged that it is possible to read Hunter and Seattle as
cases where the Court applied strict scrutiny because it saw
“some indicia of invidious intent”—what Amar and Caminker
call a “soft intent” standard—that could bring the cases under the
umbrella of traditional equal protection analysis.287 But Amar and
Caminker ultimately reject this reading, calling such a soft intent
standard an “unarticulated rationale” that should not be accepted
as an alternative to what they term a “carefully developed”
Hunter/Seattle “doctrinal framework.”288 The analysis provided in
this article differs from Amar and Caminker’s. There are few
signs here of a “carefully developed” doctrine. Indeed, it seems
more apparent that the Hunter/Seattle doctrine has been primarily
the creation of academic commentary and conjecture rather than a
true doctrine that the Court has ever acknowledged or applied. No
decision after Seattle acknowledges a Hunter/Seattle doctrine or
suggests that an equal protection violation can be established
based on anything other than intentional discrimination.

286 Accord Sunstein, supra note 43, at 138 n.42 (observing that while equal
protection analysis generally is substantive, rather than process-based, “relative
burdens of proof” on an equal protection claim can be “dependent on the likely
functioning of the political process”).
287 Amar & Caminker, supra note 25, at 1034-35.
288 Id. at 1035.
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Stephen Rich has referred to the measures struck down
in Hunter and Seattle as “inferred classifications.”289 Inferred
classifications, he writes, “overlap” with discriminatory-purpose
inquiry,290 and the Court has sometimes found them when “it
determines that a formally race neutral state action threatens
constitutional equality values typically understood to be
threatened by the use of explicit racial classifications.”291 In
Hunter and Seattle, Rich says, the Court was responding to “the
social meanings communicated by” the restructurings, social
meanings that “were sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny because of
the sociohistorical context in which” they took place.292
David Bernstein makes a similar point, though more
bluntly. On Hunter, he says, “It seems undeniable in retrospect
that electoral support for repeal of the fair housing laws in
question,” though it may have involved some element of
principled disagreement with such policies, “also had a
substantial racist component.”293 The Court “could have but did
not explicitly state that the referenda in question were both
motivated by discriminatory intent [and had] discriminatory
effects.”294 In a similar vein, though not addressing Hunter or
Seattle specifically, Richard Primus has noted that “courts often
decide whether to apply strict scrutiny based on a normative
sense that a statute is constitutionally problematic and then,
reasoning backwards, announce that something in the statute
constitutes an express classification.”295
Daniel Tokaji has observed that it is “easy to view”
Hunter and Seattle, along with Romer, “as constitutional
oddballs, difficult or impossible to explain in light of accepted
equal protection principles.”296 But he argues that these cases
“share a concern that—absent a more stringent test [than
ordinary rational basis review] for determining whether equal
protection has been denied—intentional discrimination on the
part of the polity may escape detection.”297 Cass Sunstein has
made the same point: “The classification in Hunter was not quite
See Stephen M. Rich, Inferred Classifications, 99 VA. L. REV. 1525 (2013).
Id. at 1553.
291 Id. at 1560.
292 Id. at 1547.
293 David E. Bernstein, “Reverse Carolene Products,” the End of the Second
Reconstruction, and Other Thoughts on Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action, 2013-2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 261, 263-64 (2014).
294 Id.
295 Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three,
117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 509 (2003).
296 Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion,
Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2476 (2003).
297 Id.
289

290
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a racial classification on its face; but, by its very nature, it gave
rise to suspicion that an impermissible motive was at work.”298
These insights all are helpful in illuminating why the
Court came to the conclusions it did in Hunter and Seattle. But
it is also important to appreciate that Hunter and Seattle were
never really unique. They were neither the first race cases nor
the last where the Court found what it called a “classification”
without either a facial classification of persons or a specific
finding of invidious purpose. The point further undercuts
support for the idea that the Hunter/Seattle doctrine had a
viable existence as a separate category of equal protection.
Some of the Court’s racial equal protection cases seem
driven by a certain quality of res ipsa loquitor: even where laws
were formally race neutral, the Court seemed to think the
racially motivated thinking behind them was clear. Like
Hunter and Seattle, these cases involve unspoken assumptions
about the dynamics of prejudice, assumptions that make the
Court’s analysis seem less rigorous and transparent than we
might like. In Anderson, the Court simply assumed that being
given information about a candidate’s race would encourage
Louisiana voters to make racially prejudiced voting decisions.
In Gomillion, the Court saw that the effect of the “strangely
irregular twenty-eight-sided” electoral district map of Tuskegee,
Alabama, was “to remove from the city all save only four or five
of its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single white voter
or resident.”299 But to understand the effect was to understand
the purpose: the map was “tantamount for all practical
purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation
is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters
by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of
their pre-existing municipal vote.”300 Other cases from the same
era had explained that a law can be deemed a racial classification
and thus trigger strict scrutiny if “the framework of the
peculiar facts or circumstances”301 leads the Court to conclude
that a law “encourage[s] and significantly involve[s] the State
in private racial discrimination.”302
In arguing that Hunter and Seattle should be overruled,
Justice Scalia insisted that an equal protection violation can
arise only from a facial classification on the basis of race or an

298
299
300
301
302

Sunstein, supra note 43, at 149.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).
Id.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961).
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967).
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express, on-the-record finding of invidious purpose.303 But in
light of what the Court has actually said and done in the cases
discussed above, that cramped, narrow description of equal
protection doctrine is quite obviously wrong. If accepted, it would
effectively abrogate a clutch of other important race cases that no
one seriously argues were wrongly decided. Hunter and Seattle
both found “classifications,” and that word has a specific meaning
in the Court’s race cases signaling a violation of equal protection
as traditionally understood. The Court’s other racial equal
protection cases do not use the term “classification” to describe
laws that merely impose incidental discriminatory effects.
Washington v. Davis, which Justice Scalia himself invoked,
distinguished a constitutionally forbidden “racial classification[]”
from “a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within
the power of government to pursue” that “may affect a greater
proportion of one race than of another.”304 The Washington Court
said that even where a law does not draw “racial lines,” it is still
invalid if it was “motivated by racial considerations.”305 Further,
the Court has previously referred to both Hunter and Seattle,
together with Reitman, as “precedents involving discriminatory
restructuring of government decisionmaking.”306 In short, the
Court has always given itself much more flexibility than Justice
Scalia suggested in deciding what qualifies as an intentional,
unconstitutional racial classification.
More than 10 years after Seattle was decided, in Shaw
v. Reno,307 the Court again found that a highly irregular voting
map could amount to a “racial classification,” even though
there was no facial classification of persons, and the Court did
not inquire into the possible invidious motives of the legislators
who had drawn the map. Unlike the situation in Gomillion,
here the racial gerrymandering worked in favor of black voters,
as it created two majority-minority districts and enabled black
voters to elect the state’s first black representatives to Congress
since 1898. The Court struck down the map. (It should be noted
303 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and
Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct.
1623, 1641 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing Hunter and
Seattle for finding “an equal-protection violation regardless of whether [the challenged
measure] facially classified according to race or reflected an invidious purpose to
discriminate”).
304 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
305 Id. at 240 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56, 58 (1964)).
306 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996) (emphasis added); accord,
Sunstein, supra note 43, at 159 (suggesting that “both Hunter and Seattle conformed to
the Court’s usual understanding of the evil at which the Equal Protection Clause is aimed
and to the ordinary role of heightened scrutiny in ensuring that that evil does not occur”).
307 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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that in Shaw, Justice Scalia joined Justice O’Connor’s majority
opinion in full.)
The Shaw Court underscored the by then well-established
principle that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits actions which
“although race neutral, are, on their face, ‘unexplainable on
grounds other than race.’”308 This was consistent with the Court’s
teaching in Arlington Heights that “[d]etermining whether
invidious discriminatory purpose” was behind a law sometimes
“demands a sensitive inquiry” into both “circumstantial and direct
evidence.”309 And Washington v. Davis rejected the idea that
“discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the
face of the statute,” explaining that a finding of improper
discrimination “may often be inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears
more heavily on one race than another.”310
And so, call it an “inferred classification,” call it reasoning
backwards, or call it simply the Court being too polite to actually
label lawmakers or voters as racists, the point is that the
analyses that were the basis for the decisions in Hunter and
Seattle fit within “traditional” equal protection doctrine.
Traditional equal protection doctrine does not allow for an
equal protection violation based solely on discriminatory
effects, but the doctrine has never been as narrow and rigid as
Justice Scalia claimed.
It is not difficult to suspect that, for its proponents, part
of the attractiveness of the Hunter/Seattle doctrine was that it
could be used to attack perceived racial unfairness without
actually accusing anyone of conscious, intentional race
discrimination. At the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs in Schuette
did not attempt to argue that Michigan Proposal 2 had been
impelled by racial animus or race-conscious voter decisionmaking
(though there were such suggestions in that direction in some of
their early district court filings).311 And Justice Sotomayor
308 Id. at 643 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977)).
309 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
310 Davis, 426 U.S. at 241-42.
311 In their summary judgment briefing, the Coalition plaintiffs did make
some effort to argue that Proposal 2 had been propounded and adopted out of subtle
racial animus, noting that the proponents “used the code word ‘preference’ to appeal to
white people’s fears of being displaced by the growing minority populations of this
nation,” and that support for Proposal 2 came lopsidedly from whites. Plaintiff Coal. to
Defend Affirmative Action et. al.’s Brief in Opposition to the Motions for Summary
Judgment Filed by the Attorney General and Eric Russel at 4-5, Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any
Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. (E.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2008)
(No. 06-15637). “Connerly and his supporters,” the Coalition plaintiffs said, were
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specifically disclaimed any suggestion “that Michigan’s voters
acted with anything like the invidious intent . . . of those who
historically stymied the rights of racial minorities.”312
But attempting to attack alterations to the political
process that cause racial injury without actually accusing
anyone of intentional discrimination leads to imprecision, if not
incoherence. Remember that the Hunter Court directly analogized
the Akron city charter amendment to the racist chicanery of the
Louisiana law that required that a candidate specify his race on
the ballot, and in Seattle, the Court characterized Initiative 350
as an “attack” on local school authority. Yet the Sixth Circuit and
Justice Sotomayor eschewed such loaded and candidly
judgmental language and analysis. Neither was willing to call
Proposal 2 a “racial classification,” even though that is the label
both the Hunter and Seattle Courts had used.
Justice Sotomayor said that a political majority may not
have “free rein to erect selective barriers against racial
minorities”313 or “create one process for racial minorities and a
separate, less burdensome process for everyone else.”314 She
said that Proposal 2 “alter[ed] the political process to the
detriment of a racial minority”315 and drew a “racial distinction,”316
because “[a] majority of the Michigan electorate changed the
basic rules of the political process in that State in a manner
that uniquely disadvantaged racial minorities.”317 Those
formulations come right up to the edge of describing intentional
discrimination without actually accusing Michigan voters of
race-conscious action. This approach illustrates the central
problem with the Hunter/Seattle doctrine: it was understood as
a means to strike down measures that caused racial
disadvantage without actually having to make the argument
that the disadvantage was intentionally imposed.
Similarly, there is a gingerly, let’s-not-get-our-handsdirty quality to the Sixth Circuit’s opinion. According to its
understanding of the Hunter/Seattle doctrine, the court could
“pil[ing] up . . . victories” in Michigan and other states “based on the white vote.” Id. at
6. Continuing residential and educational segregation, as well as “racial stereotyping
and bias,” they argued, “still structures everyone’s worldview and consciousness.” But
these assertions were more in the nature of a manifesto than a legal argument, and
none of them were supported by citations to any sources or evidence. Id.
312 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1652
n.1 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
313 Id. at 1683.
314 Id. at 1653.
315 Id. at 1663.
316 Id. at 1674.
317 Id. at 1652.
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strike down Proposal 2 without any need to pass judgment on,
or even consider, whether the action taken by Michigan voters
was race conscious. The Sixth Circuit said that Hunter and
Seattle’s “central principle” was “that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits requiring racial minorities to surmount more
formidable obstacles than those faced by other groups to
achieve their political objectives.”318 Did the Sixth Circuit really
believe this “requirement” had come about incidentally, merely
as a matter of effect rather than purpose? It didn’t need to say.
The court could sidestep the messy question of whether
Proposal 2 actually amounted to intentional discrimination. In
the context of the current politics of affirmative action, that
conclusion might have been explosive.
The Hunter/Seattle doctrine avoided candor on issues of
race discrimination. It is a foreseeable consequence that antiaffirmative-action measures like Proposal 2 will redistribute
resources in favor of whites to the detriment of blacks.319 If
critics of such measures believe that these consequences not only
can be foreseen but are actually intended by the proponents of the
measures—that such measures alter the status quo for raceconscious reasons and intentionally redistribute resources on
the basis of race—it would be better to make that argument
openly320 rather than attempting to attack the phenomenon
through doctrinal artifice. At the same time, it must be
acknowledged that such arguments were more easily made in
the days when the Court was more willing to ascertain raceconscious intent “o[n] an intuitive level,” as it seemed to in
Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle.321 The basis of evidence and
inferences the Court used to find intentional discrimination in
those cases reflected an understanding of race that was very
different from what is reflected in the Court’s current equal
protection jurisprudence.

318 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and
Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,
701 F.3d 466, 485 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 469-70 (1982)).
319 See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 271 (1997)
(arguing that such measures should receive heightened scrutiny because they benefit
whites at the expense of blacks).
320 For such an argument, see id. at 293-96.
321 Id. at 310.
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In Reitman and Hunter, voters went to the polls to
repeal racial antidiscrimination laws and forbid their
reinstatement by elected officials. In Seattle, voters went to the
polls to repeal and prohibit desegregative busing that had been
approved by a local school board. Although all three of these
restructurings by their terms targeted policies rather than
persons, the Supreme Court chose to understand them as raceconscious action. It labeled them “racial classifications” and
then struck them down with the application of strict scrutiny.
By contrast, in Schuette, voters went to the polls to repeal
affirmative action policies and forbid their reinstatement by
elected officials (i.e., university regents). This restructuring also
targeted a policy, rather than persons. But this time, a
majority of the Justices chose to understand the matter as
merely a good faith, even healthy, debate about public policy.
What explains the difference?
As a preliminary matter before answering this question,
it should be noted that if there were clear evidence of overt
racial animus or other invidious purpose in the campaign to
enact Proposal 2, the plaintiffs in Schuette did not attempt to
build their case on that argument. In the district court, the
case was resolved on summary judgment, without a trial, and
the plaintiffs apparently made no serious effort to build a
record showing that Proposal 2 had been debated and adopted
in an atmosphere of racial hostility or stereotypes. The district
court specifically found that “[t]he historical background of
Proposal 2 and sequence of events that preceded its passage do
not suggest discriminatory intent” because “[t]he public
arguments made in support of Proposal 2 did not appeal to
racism or amount to a call for segregation; rather, they
attempted to appeal to the public’s belief in fairness and just
treatment.”322 Although its proponents “knew that Proposal 2
might lead to fewer minority admissions, there is no evidence
that they intended this.”323
With no argument available that its primary motivation
was overtly invidious, this meant that if Proposal 2 was
unconstitutional, the basis would need to be that it created a
racial classification. As with the policies struck down in Reitman,
322 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F.
Supp. 2d 924, 952 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
323 Id.
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Hunter, and Seattle, the Court would need to conclude that
Michigan’s ban on affirmative action had been impelled by
race-conscious intent and action on the part of proponents and
voters. Even absent racist appeals or animus, the Court would
need to see it as a form of racial line drawing—an “official
distinction[ ] based on race”324 or a law that “was effectively drawn
for racial purposes.”325
But that was never going to happen. To understand the
outcome in Schuette, it is helpful to understand the turn the
Court’s racial equal protection jurisprudence has taken in
recent decades—what Reva Siegel has described as the Court’s
restriction of minority-protective equal protection review and
expansion of majority-protective equal protection review.326
Reitman and Hunter predated decisions in the 1970s where the
Court drew a harder line on the difference between
discriminatory purpose and disparate impact or incidental
effects.327 These cases “replaced doctrine that held government
to account for the foreseeable racial consequences of its actions
with a body of law that defined the constitutionality of
government’s conduct solely by reference to the purity of its
purposes.”328 Notwithstanding this doctrinal shift, the Seattle
Court in 1982 found Washington’s Initiative 350 to be a racial
classification.329 But in general, after the 1970s, it became
“extremely difficult to prove discriminatory purpose and nearly
always possible to find some reason for a government policy
with a racial disparate impact other than a purpose to harm
the group.”330
For the Schuette plurality, Proposal 2 represented nothing
more suspect than citizens statewide coming together “to seek
consensus and adopt a policy on a difficult subject.”331 Justice
Kennedy, who in other contexts has acknowledged that
disparate treatment can in fact arise from “unconscious
prejudices and disguised animus,”332 apparently saw no
possibility that implicit racial bias among white voters might
have helped drive the outcome on Proposal 2 (or, if he did,
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982).
326 Siegel, supra note 63, at 9-51.
327 See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
328 Siegel, supra note 63, at 47.
329 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
330 Siegel, supra note 63, at 47.
331 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637
(2014) (plurality opinion).
332 Tex. Dept. of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2015).
324

325
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perhaps he viewed the matter as a can of worms that was best
not opened). Justice Scalia derided the very idea that Proposal
2 could ever have Fourteenth Amendment implications: “[A]ny
law expressly requiring state actors to afford all persons equal
protection of the laws . . . does not—cannot—deny ‘to any
person . . . equal protection of the laws’ . . . regardless of
whatever evidence of seemingly foul purposes plaintiffs may
cook up in the trial court.”333
Justice Scalia’s point that prohibitions on racial
preferences do nothing more than “afford all persons equal
protection of the laws” betrays how the Court’s jurisprudence
on affirmative action has been at the center of the larger
doctrinal shifts that doomed the challenge to Proposal 2. Since
1995, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to all forms of raceconscious decisionmaking, including affirmative action programs
that were intended to benefit, not harm, racial minorities.334
Under this view, a racial preference under affirmative action is
presumptively a denial of “equal protection of the laws” just as
much as the white supremacist schemes the Court struck down
in cases like Anderson or Loving. This understanding of the
Equal Protection Clause as requiring strict, “colorblind”
neutrality on matters of race did more than sharply restrict the
use of affirmative action, however. It also meant the Court
would reject the idea that courts should determine whether any
given law or policy that discriminates in some way is racially
benign or malignant.335
In Schuette, the Sixth Circuit said, “the language of
Hunter and Seattle encompasses any legislation in the interest
of racial minorities” and “works to prevent the placement of
special procedural obstacles on minority objectives.”336 Here,
that objective was, of course, support for affirmative action. But
according to Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, this approach
was mistaken, because courts must avoid “announc[ing] what
particular issues of public policy should be classified as
advantageous to some group defined by race.”337 A majority of
333 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1648 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (first
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
334 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
335 For criticism of the idea of a “colorblind” Equal Protection Clause, see, for
example, Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967
(2010), and Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1991).
336 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and
Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,
701 F.3d 466, 486, 487 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
337 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1635 (plurality opinion).
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the Justices on the Court at the time Schuette was decided
rejected what the plurality opinion called the “demeaning
notion that members of . . . defined racial groups ascribe to
certain ‘minority views’ that must be different from those of other
citizens.”338 This group of Justices maintained that “[i]t cannot be
entertained as a serious proposition that all individuals of the
same race think alike” about affirmative action policy or any
other issue.339
Of course, no one argues that all individuals of the same
race think alike. Yet it is very hard to explain Reitman and
Hunter without recognizing that the Court took it as a given
that fair housing laws, as a matter of public policy, were
“advantageous” to racial minorities and that most members of
racial minority groups supported them (as the city’s white
electoral majority obviously did not) for that reason. Likewise,
in Seattle, the Court recognized that blacks saw desegregative
busing as “in their interest.” In the period when Reitman,
Hunter, and Seattle were decided, between 1967 and 1982,
most of the Justices almost certainly would have thought it a
matter of simple common sense, and not a demeaning or
constitutionally impermissible stereotype, to assume that the
vast majority of blacks and other racial minorities favored laws
that were intended to protect their civil rights and advance
their social equality. In Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle, the
Court seemed to regard it as an unremarkable assumption that
blacks as a group supported and benefited from the equalitypromoting government policies that voters had repealed and
prohibited through political restructurings. Therefore, the
Court understood a political attack by an electoral majority on
a policy that was beneficial to and favored by a minority to be
tantamount to a political attack on that minority as a group.
Today, anyone who can read a poll knows that affirmative
action is supported by an overwhelming number of blacks340 and
is regarded, at least by most blacks themselves, as beneficial to
338 Id. at 1634 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 1643-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s approach would “promote[ ] the noxious
fiction that, knowing only a person’s color or ethnicity, we can be sure that he has a
predetermined set of policy ‘interests,’ thus reinforc[ing] the perception that members
of the same racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which they live—think alike, [and] share the same political interests”
(quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993))).
339 Id. at 1634 (plurality opinion).
340 See, e.g., Drake, supra note 8 (reporting that 84% of blacks believe that
“affirmative action programs designed to increase the number of black and minority
students on college campuses” are a “good thing,” while 8% think they are a “bad thing”).
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them.341 Indeed, there remains a wide gap in attitudes between
whites and blacks toward affirmative action, as well as toward
the question of whether antiwhite “reverse discrimination” is
displacing antiblack racism as a problem.342 Michigan’s proposal
to prohibit affirmative action was supported by only 14% of
blacks, compared to 59% of whites.343 Moreover, blacks had
lobbied for the policies that Proposal 2 nullified.344 But the
current Court’s ideology of a race-neutral, colorblind Equal
Protection Clause and its hostility toward affirmative action
means that equal protection doctrine is no longer allowed to take
such social facts into account. As a matter of law, courts are
required to assume that minorities have no policy preferences
that could be ascribed to them as a group.
This way of thinking made the outcome in Schuette
unsurprising because it precludes, by definition, the idea that
voters’ action on a policy like affirmative action could ever be
characterized as intentional race discrimination. The ideology
of a race-neutral, colorblind Equal Protection Clause, which
assumes that there is no such thing as “minority views,”
requires that we deny as a matter of constitutional law what
we know as a matter of empirical fact: most blacks not only
favor affirmative action, they do so because they see it as being
in the interest of their racial group.
The Court’s jurisprudence on affirmative action also
doomed the Hunter/Seattle doctrine in another way, although the
opinions do not discuss it. Recall that the Hunter/Seattle analysis
set forth by both the Sixth Circuit and Justice Sotomayor
incorporated the premise that minority groups are entitled to
political-process protections that protect them from extra burdens
when they seek “to achieve legislation in their interest.” But the
Court’s doctrine precludes the idea that affirmative action is
constitutional if its goal is to improve the welfare and social
equality of racial minorities in a generalized way. The courts in
Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle easily made such assumptions
about fair housing laws and desegregative busing. The Seattle
Id.
Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Jockeying for Stigma, N.Y. TIMES
(May 23, 2011, 12:12 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/22/is-anti-whitebias-a-problem/jockeying-for-stigma [http://perma.cc/2BNW-8S2S] (reporting that while
blacks see the problem of racism as continuing, “whites tend to see it as a problem that has
been more or less ‘solved,’” and that “[i]f anything, many whites now believe that it’s antiwhite bias that’s on an upswing, to the point where it’s even more prevalent than antiblack bias—a sentiment not shared by blacks”).
343 Jaschik, supra note 216.
344 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and
Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,
701 F.3d 466, 478 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
341
342
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Court nodded to Footnote Four in explaining that courts must pay
special attention when electoral majorities attack “legislation
specifically designed to overcome the ‘special condition’ of
prejudice.”345 The Court was willing to understand restructurings
that wiped out fair housing laws and desegregative busing as
efforts to undermine racial equality. But in more recent years, the
Court has prohibited the use of affirmative action for such goals
as remedying general societal discrimination346 or providing role
models for minority students.347 In public higher education, the
promotion of “educational diversity” remains a permissible
governmental interest, and the Court has approved the narrowly
tailored use of race in admissions decisions.348 But as a matter of
law, this interest belongs to the university and the government
that sponsors it, not to blacks or any other racial minority as a
group. The Court’s denial that blacks have a protectable legal
interest in maintaining affirmative action programs undercuts
a premise of the Hunter/Seattle doctrine as applied to Proposal 2
by the Sixth Circuit and Justice Sotomayor: that the Equal
Protection Clause requires procedural protections that allow
blacks to pursue this interest through the political process.
And so, in summary, Schuette is best understood as a
logical extension of the Court’s racial equal protection
jurisprudence, and specifically its established thinking about
affirmative action, rather than as an effort to grapple with
the constitutional status of political restructurings generally.
V.

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL RESTRUCTURINGS

A.

Meaningful Review of Restructurings Should Survive
Schuette

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Schuette should not
prevent courts from giving meaningful scrutiny to future
political restructurings in order to determine whether they
were impelled by invidious intent toward a minority or other
disadvantaged group. As demonstrated in Section II.B, political
restructurings have been used to single out minority groups for
special disadvantages. In Reitman, Hunter, Seattle, and Romer,
the Court stepped in to thwart what it recognized as efforts by
electoral majorities to rig the processes of government
345 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982) (quoting
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
346 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
347 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
348 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
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decisionmaking—that is, to selectively move the decisionmaking
process on a question of public policy to a higher, more remote
level of government—in ways that were intended to disadvantage
or harm minority groups. It did so in a two-step process. First, it
took note of the restructuring itself and the ways in which it
altered the ordinary lawmaking process. Second, it examined the
operation and effects of the restructuring to determine whether
the restructuring violated the Equal Protection Clause by
imposing a racial classification (Hunter and Seattle), creating
racially discriminatory state action (Reitman), or imposing a legal
disadvantage based on animus (Romer).
Proposal 2 was also a political restructuring. It took
authority over race-conscious admissions policies away from its
normal locus in Michigan government and placed it in the state
constitution. A majority of the Justices agreed that Proposal 2
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because they did
not view Proposal 2 as manifesting subjective invidious purpose
by voters or creating the kind of objective racial classification the
Court had found in Seattle.
But Schuette’s guidance is less clear on the
constitutional implications of restructurings generally. Justices
Scalia and Sotomayor devoted most of their opinions to either
celebrating or lamenting (respectively) the demise of the
Hunter/Seattle doctrine. The plurality opinion says nothing
about political restructurings as such. It reaffirms that
government “may not alter the procedures of government to
target racial minorities.”349 But it provides almost no guidance
for lower courts and future litigants on how to identify when
such “targeting” occurs or whether restructurings are different
from other forms of lawmaking. Because it did not see Hunter
and Seattle as incompatible with traditional equal protection
doctrine, the plurality refused to join Justice Scalia in seeking
to overrule those decisions. But the plurality failed to provide
any coherent, unifying explanation of the restructuring
precedents, which include Reitman and (this article has
argued) Romer. It made no effort to link the cases together as
part of a larger doctrine or to extract common principles from
them. It declined to engage with Justice Sotomayor’s discussion
of the harms that restructurings of the political process can
inflict on minority groups. Indeed, it did not use the term
“political process” (or even the word “process”) at all, and it
349 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1632
(2014) (plurality opinion).
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used the word “restructuring” only once, in reference to the
events in Hunter.350
This article began in Part I by situating political
restructurings within the concerns of political-process theory.
Those concerns should continue to inform judicial analysis of
restructurings. The judgment in Schuette did not diminish the
principle that is evident in the earlier restructuring cases that
courts should approach restructurings with care to determine
whether the intent is to impose a disadvantage on some group
or to pursue an illegitimate government purpose: whether the
restructuring is, in fact, the product of “the ingenuity of those
who would seek to conceal [unconstitutional discrimination] by
subtleties and claims of neutrality.”351 Reitman, Hunter,
Seattle, and Romer all reflected an analysis that was calibrated
and informed by the fact that a policy question involving a
minority group had been taken away from the ordinary
lawmaking process and committed to a higher, more remote
level of government. The Court in these cases was sensitive to
the unusual, “sophisticated” form of discrimination that
restructurings can produce. Accordingly, it carefully scrutinized
the restructurings to understand their actual purposes and
effects. Careful examination at the outset helped to identify forms
of invidious discrimination that were built into the design or
enforcement of the laws, though not necessarily apparent on their
face. Even in cases where it has denied equal protection claims
that arose from political restructurings, the Supreme Court
still examined whether the record supported a claim that a
seemingly neutral law had actually been aimed at a racial
minority352 or whether the challenged action burdened an
“independently identifiable group or category.”353
Nor did the judgment in Schuette affect the Court’s
guidance in other cases that the disparate impact of a policy
change or departures from ordinary decisionmaking procedures
remain relevant to a court’s task of assessing the possible
presence of invidious discrimination.354 Thus, courts reviewing
Id.
Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 834 (Cal. 1966), aff’d sub nom. Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
352 See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141-43 (1971) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause was not violated by a California state constitutional amendment that
required any new low-income housing project to be subject to a community vote).
353 See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5, 7-8 (1971) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause was not violated by a rule requiring a supermajority referendum
vote for local tax increases or bonded indebtedness).
354 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
350
351
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challenges to restructurings should be alert to facts and
circumstances that might indicate that the restructuring was
undertaken with the intent to harm a minority or other
disadvantaged group. A close look is required if a court is to
understand an enactment’s “‘immediate objective,’ its ‘ultimate
effect’ and its ‘historical context and the conditions existing prior
to its enactment.’”355
Expecting a court to scrutinize a restructuring for
possible animus is not inconsistent with the ordinary principles
of equal protection review. Traditional rational basis review is
highly deferential because it assumes a properly functioning
process of routine and ordinary legislative lawmaking. For
example, in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.356—which
extolled rational basis review as a “paradigm of judicial
restraint”357—the Rehnquist Court explained that equal
protection as applied to “areas of social and economic policy” is
“not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic
of legislative choices.”358 Plaintiffs “attacking the rationality of
the legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it.’”359 Judicial review
should be limited and deferential, the Court said, “where the
legislature must necessarily engage in a process of linedrawing,” because “the legislature must be allowed leeway to
approach a perceived problem incrementally.”360
By contrast, restructurings do not involve a careful
process of line drawing or incremental approaches to everyday
social and economic problems. Rather, they represent
deliberate decisions to selectively remove a specific issue from
the ordinary legislative process at the level where that question
customarily has been addressed. The ordinary assumption
under rational basis review is that “even improvident decisions
will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that
judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how
unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.”361 But the
whole point of a restructuring is to turn that presumption on
its ear and ensure that the matter settled through the
restructuring cannot be revisited by a political branch.
Moreover, “[t]he presumption of constitutionality and the
Reitman, 387 U.S. at 373 (quoting Reitman, 413 P.2d 825).
FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
357 Id. at 314.
358 Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
359 Id. at 314-15 (emphasis added) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto
Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
360 Id. at 315, 316 (emphasis added).
361 Id. at 314 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
355
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approval given ‘rational’ classifications in other types of
enactments are based on an assumption that the institutions of
state government are structured so as to represent fairly all the
people.”362 But “when the challenge to the statute is in effect a
challenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no
longer serve as the basis for presuming constitutionality.”363
To be clear, the kind of judicial review this article
suggests would apply only to political restructurings that affect
minority or other disadvantaged groups, and its purpose should
be to help a court understand whether the restructuring was
motivated by animus toward such a group.364 It should not be
used to involve courts in second guessing legislative decisions or
state constitutional amendments that preempt local government
decisionmaking on quotidian business and economic matters. And
so, for example, only ordinary rational basis review should apply
if a state moves to prevent its local governments from banning
plastic grocery bags. But more careful review for possible
animus should apply if a state, without any apparent legitimate
or neutral reason, suddenly acts to selectively withdraw
authority from local governments over a civil rights question,
such as their ability to maintain antidiscrimination laws
protecting gays, lesbians, or transgender persons.365
This proposal is consistent with principles from the
restructuring precedents that were unaffected by Schuette. It is
also consistent with Footnote Four of Carolene Products,366 the
wellspring for political-process theory. According to Footnote
Four, an enactment should receive closer judicial examination
when it “tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities.”367 Experience shows that the problem that this part
of Footnote Four warned against often is exactly what
restructurings are intended to do. By moving a policy matter to a
higher, more remote level of government, restructurings provide
362 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969)
(footnote omitted).
363 Id.
364 For a discussion of how animus is identified and analyzed, see Dale
Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183,
243-48 (2013).
365 See Richard Socarides, North Carolina and the Gay-Rights Backlash, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/north-carolinaand-the-gay-rights-backlash [http://perma.cc/C3D5-8Q9C] (discussing a “sweeping antigay and anti-transgender law” in North Carolina “that eliminates all local L.G.B.T.
anti-discrimination measures,” and comparing the law to the measure that was struck
down in Romer).
366 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
367 Id.
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insurance against the possibility that a policy question can be
revisited and reconsidered in the normal course of the ordinary
political process. Such tampering with the political process
potentially acquires constitutional implications when its intent
is to impose a disadvantage on a minority group.
There is no reason to believe that majorities will tire of
attempting to alter the ordinary political lawmaking process to
increase their chances of winning battles over policy or to insulate
earlier victories from possible future changes of fortune. It is
plausible to imagine that activist groups that have become
restive or dissatisfied with the way elected legislators have
handled questions involving voting regulations, undocumented
aliens, LGBT rights, and other issues may decide to take things
into their own hands by drafting measures aimed at enacting
more restrictive requirements for voting. Such requirements
would affect racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, and the
elderly,368 making life more difficult for those who have
immigrated here without following the rules,369 or setting back
progress that has been made against discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation.
Giving meaningful scrutiny to restructurings for animus
does not require identifying new classes for suspect or quasisuspect status. It does not put a thumb on the scales of judicial
review for any particular group. And it need not subject
governments to a higher burden of justification for restructurings
that do not affect minority or other disadvantaged groups. It
simply recognizes that restructurings are a deviation from the
ordinary processes by which public policy is made, with its
safeguards for participation and representation, and that
restructurings have a sufficient association with the oppression
of political minorities that they should be examined with
special care. In Romer, the Court characterized its review as
“rational basis,” while recognizing that “[d]iscriminations of an
unusual character especially suggest careful consideration.”370
368 See, e.g., Voting Laws Roundup 2014, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Dec. 18,
2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-laws-roundup-2014 [http://perma.cc/
DGP4-RXG5] (observing that “[v]oting rights continues to be a highly contentious issue
in America” and that “scores of laws to make it harder to vote” have been considered in
“dozens of states”).
369 See, e.g., E.J. Dionne Jr., Culture Wars, Old and New, WASH. POST (Jan.
25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ej-dionne-culture-wars-old-and-ne
w/2015/01/25/a3e40e56-a33e-11e4-9f89-561284a573f8_story.html [http://perma.cc/B4F
X-4HR3] (arguing that “the new culture war . . . is about national identity rather than
religion . . . . It focuses on which groups the United States will formally admit to
residence and citizenship”).
370 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)) (alteration in original).
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That sound guidance remains good law for analyzing political
restructurings going forward
B.

Direct Democracy: Aspiration and Reality

Finally, it is worth considering whether, after Schuette,
courts must give special deference to laws, including
restructurings, that are enacted through direct democracy. The
answer should be no.
The definition of a restructuring used in this article—
moving the place where a specific policy question is determined to
a higher, more remote level of government—typically involves
amending a state constitution or city charter. And since such
amendments typically must be approved by voters at the ballot
box either as initiatives or referenda, restructurings almost
always implicate direct democracy.371 All the restructurings
discussed in this article were accomplished through voter
approval at the ballot box.
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Schuette includes a
long passage of dictum that sings the praises of direct democracy
in prose so purple that it would make the most earnest civics
teacher blush.372 Justice Kennedy postulated that “[o]ur
constitutional system embraces . . . the right of citizens to
debate so they can learn and decide and then, through the
political process, act in concert to try to shape the course of
their own times.”373 With Proposal 2, he said, “Michigan voters
[had] acted in concert and statewide to seek consensus and
adopt a policy on a difficult subject against a historical
background of race in America that has been a source of
tragedy and persisting injustice.”374 He continued,
Were the Court to rule that the question addressed by Michigan
voters is too sensitive or complex to be within the grasp of the
electorate; or that the policies at issue remain too delicate to be
resolved save by university officials or faculties, acting at some
remove from immediate public scrutiny and control; or that these
matters are so arcane that the electorate’s power must be limited
because the people cannot prudently exercise that power even after a
full debate, that holding would be an unprecedented restriction on the
exercise of a fundamental right held not just by one person but by all

371 Cf. Murray, supra note 25, at 475 (suggesting that the Hunter/Seattle
doctrine should be confined to enactments arising out of direct democracy).
372 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 163637 (2014) (plurality opinion).
373 Id.
374 Id. at 1637.
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in common. It is the right to speak and debate and learn and then, as
a matter of political will, to act through a lawful electoral process.375

One of the ways that society rises above “its past
mistakes” and “persisting biases,” Justice Kennedy said, is
through “respectful, rational deliberation.”376 Such a “process is
impeded, not advanced, by court decrees based on the
proposition that the public cannot have the requisite repose to
discuss certain issues.”377 Not only that, but
[i]t is demeaning to the democratic process to presume that the
voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on
decent and rational grounds. The process of public discourse and
political debate should not be foreclosed even if there is a risk that
during a public campaign there will be those, on both sides, who seek
to use racial division and discord to their own political advantage.
An informed public can, and must, rise above this. The idea of
democracy is that it can, and must, mature. Freedom embraces the
right, indeed the duty, to engage in a rational, civic discourse in
order to determine how best to form a consensus to shape the destiny
of the Nation and its people.378

What to make of this portion of the plurality opinion? It is
properly categorized as dictum, because it did not bear on the
ultimate question in Schuette: Did Proposal 2 violate the Equal
Protection Clause? Justice Kennedy pointed to no evidence that
anyone argued that the constitutionality of Proposal 2 should
be decided by the courts because affirmative action was “too
sensitive or too complex” to be left to voters.379 Nor was Justice
Kennedy apparently making a doctrinal argument or giving
guidance to lower courts about their responsibilities under
judicial review, since he cited no cases that would support the
notion that the Court has tread more lightly in its analysis when
a law results from direct democracy rather than a legislature.
None of the political restructuring cases before Schuette
reflect such faith in direct democracy in either their rhetoric or
their results. As demonstrated in Section II.B, the Court took
special note that the enactments in those cases were
restructurings, and this caused the Court to examine them
carefully. None of the three race cases in the restructuring line—
Reitman, Hunter, or Seattle—involved facial classifications of
persons. The Court had no warrant to apply strict scrutiny until it
had first considered the history, purpose, and effects of the
375
376
377
378
379

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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enactments in each case. Without careful attention to the design of
the laws and the circumstances under which they were enacted,
the Court plausibly could have dismissed the equal protection
claims in all three cases as involving merely policy changes
that had a disproportionate impact on blacks. It was only after
careful examination that the Court concluded that in each of
these cases the enactments at issue had been adopted with an
intent to create a racial classification or to give the government’s
blessing to private race discrimination. In Reitman, the Court
affirmed an opinion of the California Supreme Court that observed
that “[w]hen the electorate assumes to exercise the law-making
function, then the electorate is as much a state agency as any of its
elected officials.”380 The Hunter Court noted that “insisting . . . that
the people may retain for themselves the power over certain
subjects may generally be true, but these principles furnish no
justification for a legislative structure which otherwise would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment,” and added, “Nor does the
implementation of this change through popular referendum
immunize it. The sovereignty of the people is itself subject to those
constitutional limitations which have been duly adopted and
remain unrepealed.”381 Seattle underscored that, where a political
restructuring is imposed that would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, the restructuring is not “immunize[d]” by “the
implementation of this change through popular referendum.”382
And of course Romer, authored by none other than Justice
Kennedy, noted that the “unusual character” of Amendment 2 as
a restructuring caused the Court to examine it with special care,
and the Court did not shrink from concluding that an antigay state
constitutional amendment approved by the voters of Colorado not
only “lack[ed] a rational relationship to legitimate state interests”
but “seem[ed] inexplicable by anything but animus.”383
The encomium to faith in citizens’ abilities to decide
“sensitive” issues on “decent and rational grounds” without
judicial interference seems especially hollow given that Justice
Kennedy would lead a Court majority one year later in a
decision, Obergefell v. Hodges,384 that struck down bans on
same-sex marriage in 13 states—all of which had been
approved by voters, in the same manner as Michigan’s Proposal
2, as amendments to their state constitutions. (Indeed, one of
Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 834 (Cal. 1966).
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969) (citation omitted).
382 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 476 (1982) (quoting
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392).
383 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
384 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
380

381
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the cases before the Court in Obergefell came from Michigan.)
Lower federal courts had previously struck down numerous
other voter-approved state marriage-equality bans in decisions
the Supreme Court let stand. Taking note of his own words
about direct democracy in Schuette, Justice Kennedy said
simply that “when the rights of persons are violated, ‘the
Constitution requires redress by the courts,’ notwithstanding
the more general value of democratic decisionmaking. This
holds true even when protecting individual rights affects issues
of the utmost importance and sensitivity.”385
And so the Schuette plurality’s valentine to direct
democracy should be understood to have no doctrinal
significance. It boils down to a teaching that citizens debating
and voting on public issues is a nice thing, unless in doing so
they violate the Constitution. There is nothing new in that
teaching. It remains true that the Court “has failed to provide a
coherent or even internally consistent analysis of how courts
ought to go about reviewing direct democracy measures affecting
minority interests and rights.”386 A substantial literature on
direct democracy documents that it is frequently harmful to
minority rights.387 What we actually know about direct
democracy should only deepen concern about its potential to
run roughshod over the rights of minority groups.
For example, Justice Kennedy postulated an “informed
public.” But research shows that most voters participating in
initiatives or referenda lack the necessary knowledge to make an
informed decision. As Ilya Somin writes in a recent book on
democracy and political ignorance, “Extensive evidence suggests
that most Americans have little political knowledge. That
ignorance covers knowledge of specific issues, knowledge of political
leaders and parties, and knowledge of political institutions.”388
Indeed, Somin suggests that the “sheer depth” of Americans’
political ignorance, as well as “the pervasiveness of ignorance about

Id. at 2605 (quoting Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1637).
Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums
in Which Majorities Vote on Minorities’ Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399,
405 (1999).
387 See, e.g., id.; Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41
AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 257 (1997); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not
“Republican Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19
(1993); Eule, supra note 47; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to
Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978).
388 ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 36 (2013).
385

386
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a wide range of political issues,” would be “shocking” to anyone who
has not bothered to look at the research.389
If voters lack necessary information to make informed,
intelligent decisions on questions of government policy, they
become easy targets for the demagogues and messagemanipulators who have become features of modern American
direct democracy. As Julian Eule observed, “[p]roponents and
opponents of . . . ballot measures do little to assist voter
understanding. Indeed, quite to the contrary, the motivating
factor behind their efforts often seems to be to confuse the voter
about the significance of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. Illustrations of
deceptive advertising and sloganeering abound.”390
In initiative campaigns, there is seldom any serious,
structured examination of a law’s potential consequences. As
the authors of a study of Colorado’s Amendment 2 (the state
constitutional provision struck down in Romer) observed,
voters “are more frequently swayed by emotional rhetoric and
sound bites.”391 Thus, the proponents of Amendment 2 “could
reasonably expect that voters going into the booth . . . would
make their decisions based not on Amendment 2’s text but
rather on the questions made popular during the campaign,
such as whether one is ‘for or against’ homosexuality or
whether one opposes ‘special rights.’”392
Indeed, the proponents of political restructurings
understand that direct democracy tends to entrench existing
majority positions on matters of public policy and thus places
political minorities at an even greater disadvantage. The
proponents of restructurings understand that such dynamics
work to their advantage; indeed, exploiting such dynamics is
typically a motivating rationale behind a restructuring. The
proponents of Amendment 2 forthrightly acknowledged in state
court proceedings that they chose to use the initiative process
because it would amplify the power of the political majority
that they believed was opposed to gay/lesbian civil rights in
Colorado, with the aim of depriving gays and lesbians of the
gains they had made up until that point by working through
the normal legislative lawmaking process. As described by the
389 Id. at 17; see also Paul Krugman, Hating Good Government, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/opinion/paul-krugman-hating-goodgovernment.html [http://perma.cc/57LZ-AKMA] (observing that “[o]n issues that range from
monetary policy to the control of infectious disease, a big chunk of America’s body politic
holds views that are completely at odds with, and completely unmovable by, actual
experience. . . . [T]he fact is that we’re living in a political era in which facts don’t matter”).
390 Eule, supra note 47, at 1517.
391 KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 207, at 107.
392 Id.
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authors of a study of Amendment 2’s history, the amendment’s
proponents “calculated that, by seeking out voters directly,
they had a greater likelihood of success than if they went to
elected legislators who they believed were subject to the
influence of gay civil rights leaders.”393 The proponents of
Amendment 2 regarded the lobbying of gay/lesbian leaders at
the legislature—the quintessential stuff of the ordinary
democratic lawmaking process—as illegitimate “aggression” by
“gay militants.”394 As Will Perkins, the cofounder of Colorado
for Family Values, the organization that was the primary
proponent of Amendment 2, testified at trial,
[W]e wanted to use the initiative process instead of trying to go
through the legislature [because] we were very aware of the fact of
the very strong political influence that the homosexual proponents
had. And it’s much easier for them to influence a small group of
legislators as opposed to having everyone have an opportunity to
express their opinion on the issue.395

The bans on same-sex marriage that had been written
into state constitutions between 1998 and 2012 are another
example of restructurings that were driven by invidious
purposes.396 These measures were not intended simply to enact
marriage discrimination, but rather to freeze it in place
indefinitely, to permanently disadvantage the group seeking to
marry, to effectively shut down the legislative and legal debate
over marriage equality just as it was getting off the ground,
and to insulate the question from future legislative
reconsideration or state judicial review.
Policing the excesses of direct democracy does not
require that courts ascertain the subjective motives—what was
actually going on in the hearts and minds—of individual voters
who voted yes or no on a particular ballot issue. In Reitman,
Hunter, Seattle, and Romer, the Court did not purport to read
the minds of thousands or millions of individual voters. What it
did do was attempt to make sense of the action those voters
had taken collectively. In Rietman, Hunter, and Seattle, the
Court was persuaded that the challenged measures all drew
lines in a way that objectively made them racial classifications.
And in Romer, the Court concluded that Amendment 2 had
been motivated by “animus”—that is, it had the purpose of
Id.
Id. at 109.
395 Id. at 107 (second alteration in original) (quoting Will Perkins, CFV cofounder).
396 See Sanders, supra note 46 (arguing that state constitutional amendments
banning same-sex marriage are restructurings that should receive heightened scrutiny).
393
394
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willfully inflicting an injury on gays and lesbians—because of the
incoherence between the amendment’s purported justifications
and its actual operation and effects. The amendment imposed
sweeping and unusual legal disabilities on gays and lesbians
that simply could not be justified by what the state claimed as
its legitimate interests.
CONCLUSION
Political restructurings can appear benign and neutral on
the surface, but experience shows that they are sometimes
motivated by constitutionally improper purposes or intentions.
When a majority uses a restructuring to flex its political muscles
and permanently take away a minority group’s rights or
impose a meaningful legal or political disadvantage, the matter
calls for alert and sensitive judicial scrutiny. Although it
effectively announced the demise of the Hunter/Seattle doctrine,
Schuette did not alter this principle. Although invidious
discrimination may not, in the end, be found, courts should not
abdicate their responsibility to be certain.

